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THE DEATH OF INFERENCE 
ANDREW S. POLLIS* 
Abstract: This Article examines a disturbing trend in civil litigation: the demise 
of the jury’s historic prerogative to draw inferences from circumstantial evidence. 
Judges have arrogated to themselves the power to dismiss cases if they find the 
proffered inferences factually implausible. They have increasingly dismissed 
cases under the “equal-inference rule” by finding the proffered inferences no 
more plausible than other available inferences. And they have severely limited 
the powerful inferences jurors can draw when they conclude that a witness has 
lied. Commentators have bemoaned the heightened-pleading standard of the 
2007 and 2009 U.S. Supreme Court cases, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, but that heightened standard is only one slice of a larger pattern 
of power reallocation that has diminished the jury’s role in evaluating circum-
stantial evidence. The problem is particularly acute in cases involving defend-
ants’ subjective states of mind, where defendants typically have both exclusive 
control over the direct evidence and a motive to conceal the truth. Instead of tes-
tifying live before a diverse group of factfinders, defendants can avoid liability 
by hiding their demeanor in a paper record submitted only to a judge. This Arti-
cle proposes a three-tiered solution that would revest juries with inference-
drawing power in state-of-mind cases while simultaneously instilling protections 
against the perceived costs of jury trials. The proposed solution ensures that 
state-of-mind cases may always proceed to discovery and trial. But it also allows 
for fee shifting to dissuade plaintiffs and their attorneys from pursuing weak cas-
es and encourages judges to invoke more frequently their existing power to order 
retrial of cases in which verdicts appear to be incorrect. 
INTRODUCTION 
When people do bad things, they have a motive to avoid getting caught. 
So sometimes they lie. This is such a familiar concept that we have common 
cultural reference points. Think of the child who denies stealing from the cook-
ie jar (popularized by a children’s song game) or the cliché of the teenager who 
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denies responsibility for a new dent on the car. The wrongdoer in these situa-
tions hopes that the lie—a direct denial of the accusation—will stymie any ef-
fort to uncover the truth of the wrongdoing. 
But the liar’s demeanor and inconsistent explanations may expose the lie, 
especially when the accuser has an opportunity to probe. And when the cover-
up fails, the natural inference is that the accusation was true. In other words, 
the circumstantial evidence exposing the lie leads to the inference, based on 
our human experience,1 that the truth is in fact the opposite of the lie.2 
The ability to draw that type of inference is a critical tool in our quest to 
form judgments about our interactions as we go about our everyday lives. Do I 
believe this politician? Can I trust that salesperson? Should I hire this job ap-
plicant? These interactions do not necessarily involve lie detection, but they do 
implicate more general notions of trustworthiness that are integral to our rou-
tine decision making. Daily life often requires us to determine what we believe 
is going on in someone else’s head.3 
One might therefore expect that similar inference-drawing tasks would be 
integral to our judicial system, which ostensibly prides itself on the role of ju-
rors, as ordinary citizens with a diversity of human experiences, to resolve dis-
putes.4 Indeed, under the Seventh Amendment,5 civil jury trials are a funda-
mental right.6 To be sure, jurors are still routinely vested with the task of de-
termining witness credibility in cases that go to trial7 and are generally given 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Paulino v. Harrison, 542 F.3d 692, 700 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We have defined ‘circum-
stantial evidence’ as ‘that which establishes the fact to be proved only through inference based on 
human experience that a certain circumstance is usually present when another certain circumstance or 
set of circumstances is present.’” (quoting Radomsky v. United States, 180 F.2d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 
1950))). 
 2 See, e.g., Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 268–69 (2d Cir. 1952) (reasoning that it is logical 
to assume the opposite of the defendant’s testimony if it appears to be fabricated). 
 3 Cf. Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries—Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts, 
1989 WIS. L. REV. 237, 272 (“Credibility evaluations are probably the most common way in which we 
evaluate the intentions and knowledge of others.”). 
 4 See Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944) (explaining that it is the jury’s 
role to weigh evidence, draw inferences, and reach conclusions); Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 218 U.S. 
78, 86 (1910) (“But what the facts were . . . and what conclusions were to be drawn from them were 
for the jury and cannot be reviewed here.”); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Jury Instructions as 
Constitutional Education, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 233, 293 (2013) (proposing that jurors be instructed on 
the value of jury service, including an admonition to remain tolerant toward fellow jurors’ diverse 
opinions because each juror has a unique life experience). 
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”). 
 6 E.g., Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882) (“[T]he trial by jury is a fundamental guaran-
tee of the rights and liberties of the people.”). 
 7 See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 702 (2004) (“We have . . . counseled submission of the 
credibility issue to the jury . . . .”). 
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instructions about the value of circumstantial evidence.8 But judges now enjoy 
ever-greater power to dispose of cases—and thus to draw their own infer-
ences—instead of honoring the historic tradition of permitting juries to evalu-
ate competing inferences. And they do so based on paper records instead of 
live-witness trials. 
The expansion of judges’ power is a recent trend. The erosion of the his-
toric right to a jury in civil cases is tied to modern concerns about both the 
costs of litigation9 and the greater complexities of civil disputes.10 If these con-
siderations have warranted a reexamination of the right to a jury trial, then 
perhaps we might have expected an explicit cost-benefit analysis addressing 
the competing interests.11 But that is not what we got. 
Instead, the judiciary has systematically undermined the powerful tool of 
inference drawing, which was once a hallmark of the factfinder’s evaluation of 
evidence, without grappling with the attendant Seventh Amendment problem. 
The trend is particularly onerous for plaintiffs alleging a defendant’s nefarious 
state of mind, such as claims of discrimination, fraud, or conspiracy, where 
defendants may have exclusive access to the facts surrounding plaintiffs’ 
claims.12 This usurpation of the jury’s role has recently led to a remarkable 
                                                                                                                           
 8 E.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) (“[J]uries are routinely instructed that 
‘[t]he law makes no distinction between the weight or value to be given to either direct or circumstan-
tial evidence.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting 1A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL 
JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL § 12.04 (5th ed. 2000))). 
 9 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (justifying heightened-pleading 
requirements by observing that “proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive”). But see Arthur 
R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and 
Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 
passim (2003) (taking issue with the premise that litigation has grown both too voluminous and too 
expensive). 
 10 See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 474 (1993) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that jurors are “ordinary citizens” who “are more susceptible to [impermissible] 
influences than judges”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (In re Japanese Elec. 
Prods. Antitrust Litig.), 631 F.2d 1069, 1088 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting the various difficulties for juries 
tasked with deciding complex cases); Fabrikant v. Bache & Co. (In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig.), 609 F.2d 
411, 429–30 (9th Cir. 1979) (“The opponents of the use of juries in complex civil cases generally 
assume that jurors are incapable of understanding complicated matters.”). 
 11 Whether a traditional cost-benefit analysis is appropriate in the face of a fundamental constitu-
tional right is a separate question. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON 
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 207 (2004) (exploring this issue). 
Weighing the costs of protecting the right to a jury trial against the value it provides may be impossi-
ble because “important categories of benefits are priceless.” See id. Such an analysis requires account-
able costs to be measured alongside intangible benefits, an inherently “unbalanced comparison.” See 
id. 
 12 Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Presuit Discovery, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 43, 
52 (2010) [hereinafter Dodson, Federal Pleading] (noting that “facts may be solely in the hands of the 
defendants or hostile third parties” in these types of cases); see also Scott Dodson, New Pleading, 
New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 66 (2010) [hereinafter Dodson, New Pleading] (same). Thus, 
because “mental states are notoriously hard to prove,” a plaintiff’s only opportunity for success may 
be in persuading the jury to draw an inference from ambiguous information. See Robert G. Bone, 
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movement away from the once-venerated civil trial.13 One commentator con-
servatively estimates that recent changes in pleading standards alone have had 
a negative impact on plaintiffs in about one out of every five cases.14 And 
changes in pleading standards are only part of the story. The slow but steady 
eradication of the jury’s inference-drawing domain over the last several dec-
ades has led us to a quiet acceptance of a devastating reality that infects not 
only our system for resolving disputes, but also the important role that diverse 
jurors play in reaching verdicts that reflect our values and shape our norms. 
Thus, the notion that our judicial system openly allows plaintiffs to resolve 
their disputes fairly is false.15 
This Article explores, and argues for the restoration of, the jury’s role as 
inference drawer, while simultaneously recommending protections to avoid 
letting plaintiffs and juries run amok. It proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly 
describes the concerns that animated the jury-trial right embodied in the Sev-
enth Amendment and discusses signs, first emerging in the late 1970s, that we 
have lost some of the impetus for preserving that historic right.16 
                                                                                                                           
Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 849, 877 (2010). 
 13 John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 
524 (2012) (describing the “virtual abandonment of the centuries-old institution of trial” as a “striking 
trend in the administration of civil justice in the United States in recent decades”). 
 14 See Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of 
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2334 (2012). In addition, “nearly 
two-fifths . . . of cases with [motions to dismiss] granted . . . as to some claims would not have had 
[these motions] granted had the pleading regime not changed.” Id. at 2334–35. To be sure, there is no 
consensus as to how the changed pleading standards have affected plaintiffs despite “[s]ome twenty 
published and unpublished studies [that] now offer systematic empirical analysis” of their impact. See 
David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 1203, 1204 n.7 (2013). One recent study, for example, concluded that the heightened-pleading 
standard did not engender “a major change in how district courts have applied the law of pleading.” 
William H.J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in Procedural Standards, with Application to Bell Atlantic 
v. Twombly, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 59 (2013). This Article focuses on doctrinal integrity and makes 
no effort to refute empirical work, but I note that the statistics underlying Professor Hubbard’s analy-
sis included only “cases filed from May 2005 to May 2008,” id. at 49–50, and therefore did not con-
sider the important implications of the Supreme Court’s subsequent pleading-standard decision in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), discussed infra notes 97–107 and accompanying text. A more 
recent examination of the empirical evidence concluded “that anti-plaintiff pronouncements have 
observable anti-plaintiff effects, just as one would expect.” Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisen-
berg, Plaintiphobia in the Supreme Court, 162 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2347360, archived at http://perma.cc/
V7PW-CMGX. 
 15 Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 143, 147 (2010) (“[T]he common perception of our judicial system as open and accessible—a 
place for people to go to actually have their disputes adjudicated on their merits—is something of a 
farce.”). Instead, procedural developments have resulted in litigation being too frequently foreclosed 
at a premature stage. See infra notes 82–261 and accompanying text (exploring this assertion). 
 16 See infra notes 23–70 and accompanying text. 
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Part II, the heart of the Article, focuses on three problem areas where 
courts have failed to respect the jury’s historic domain to resolve competing 
inferences.17 The case law demonstrates a continuing trend toward reducing 
the jury’s inference-drawing power in three particular ways: (1) by characteriz-
ing inferences as implausible; (2) by negating the jury’s right to select between 
two inferences when both are equally plausible; and (3) by disregarding the 
powerful inferences available when a jury concludes that a witness has offered 
false testimony. In each of these areas, courts have dealt fatal blows to the his-
torically important jury function of evaluating and selecting among competing 
inferences. 
Part III explains the fallout of this trend.18 It demonstrates the falsity of 
the assumption that judges are better equipped than juries to discard dubious 
inferences and highlights the sociopolitical consequences of labeling jurors as 
unreasonable based on heuristics that judges conclude are outside the main-
stream. The prevailing case law ultimately disaffects entire populations of po-
tential jurors by deeming them unsuitable to resolve competing inferences. In 
doing so, it undermines the founding values that inspired our jury system in the 
first place. 
Finally, in Part IV, I propose an alternative designed both to reinvigorate 
the jury’s historic role and to meet the concerns of those who distrust the jury 
system.19 My suggestion involves three interwoven components: (1) drastically 
reducing pretrial disposition of civil cases that involve a defendant’s state of 
mind; (2) shifting fees to the losing party if a jury finds that the factual infer-
ences supporting that party’s position are extremely weak; and (3) expanding 
the grant of new trials in cases where the judge believes a verdict is against the 
manifest weight of the evidence. In conjunction, these reforms would restore 
the jury’s rightful place to draw inferences, encourage plaintiffs to think care-
fully before going forward with cases in which the jury is not likely to return a 
favorable verdict, and offer a measure of protection against the perception that 
juries are too plaintiff-friendly. To be sure, these reforms would not come 
without costs, including to plaintiffs who risk paying their adversaries’ legal 
expenses if they choose to proceed to trial in cases where the available infer-
ences supporting their claims are extremely weak. But the opportunity to incur 
that risk is far better than the current system, in which those same plaintiffs’ 
cases are dismissed outright. 
Many commentators have written about the vanishing trial20 and the Su-
preme Court’s recent “gatekeeping” decisions,21 and some have discussed in-
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 71–261 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 262–309 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 310–378 and accompanying text. 
 20 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 13, at 524; Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: 
Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2–4 (1996); Margo 
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dividual elements of the solution I propose.22 But this is the first Article to cat-
egorize and explore the three specific types of inferences that juries, over time, 
have lost the power to evaluate. And it is the first to offer a three-part package 
designed both to resurrect the inference and to inoculate it against the attacks 
of those responsible for its untimely demise. 
I. THE FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES BEHIND THE DEFERENCE TO JURIES 
Before turning specifically to the judicial assault on juries’ inference-
drawing powers, Section A of this Part briefly explains that the foundational 
principles underlying those powers are deeply rooted in our political history,23 
and Section B discusses the particular historical importance of juries’ infer-
ence-drawing power with respect to demeanor evidence.24 Nevertheless, as 
described in Section C, an erosion of these foundational principles began in the 
late 1970s,25 setting the stage for the current crisis.26 
A. The Jury as Democratic Ideal 
A century ago, the Supreme Court confirmed “that it is the province of the 
jury to hear the evidence and by their verdict to settle the issues of fact, no 
matter what the state of the evidence.”27 That broad pronouncement was in 
keeping with the general understanding, framed by the Seventh Amendment, 
that the civil jury was “a bastion of liberty”28 and “a critical component of a 
representative government.”29 Alexander Hamilton noted that the right to a 
jury trial was one of the few areas of consensus among the Framers.30 Thus, a 
                                                                                                                           
Schlanger, What We Know and What We Should Know About American Trial Trends, 2006 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 35, 36–37. 
 21 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 821, 824–31 (2010); Levin, supra note 15, at 148; Miller, supra note 9, passim. 
 22 See Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil Proce-
dure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 1033–37 (1998) (proposing fee shifting); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judg-
ing Jury Verdicts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 157, 162–163 (2008) (proposing greater resort to new trials based 
on the manifest weight of evidence). 
 23 See infra notes 27–38 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 39–48 and accompanying text. 
 25 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 338–39 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(lamenting that the right of a jury trial had fallen victim to the Court’s “erosive process”). 
 26 See infra notes 49–70 and accompanying text.  
 27 Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 387 (1913) (emphasis added). 
 28 Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1412 (1997). 
 29 Nancy Gertner, From “Rites” to “Rights”: The Decline of the Criminal Jury Trial, 24 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 433, 434 (2012); see also William V. Dorsaneo, III, Reexamining the Right to Trial by 
Jury, 54 SMU L. REV. 1695, 1697 n.9 (2001) (collecting other commentators’ similar views). 
 30 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 421 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (noting that the 
Framers “concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any difference be-
tween them it consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter repre-
sent it as the very palladium of free government”). 
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key purpose behind the right of a jury trial was to protect against government 
encroachment upon the rights of citizens in civil and criminal actions.31 This 
right directly restrains judicial officers from enforcing government tyranny 
through elitist decision making.32 The desire “to protect citizens from tyranni-
cal government” was so strong that American juries originally decided not only 
issues of fact, but issues of law as well.33 
But protection from tyranny was not the only purpose; there was also a 
political one. Alexis de Toqueville suggested that “[t]he institution of the jury 
. . . really puts the direction of society into the hands of the people.”34 In that 
sense, the jury “is, before everything[,] a political institution” with “a republi-
can character.”35 De Tocqueville celebrated jury service as a means not only of 
“making the people reign,” but also of “teaching them to reign.”36 The Su-
preme Court has expressed a similar sentiment: “Just as suffrage ensures the 
people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is 
meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”37 One scholar has thus noted 
that jury service, like suffrage, is a fundamental political right.38 
B. The Historic Deference to Jury Evaluation of Demeanor Evidence 
A secondary foundational principle of the jury system is that “the jury 
is the lie detector.”39 The roots of that maxim lie in the confrontation 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183 (1991) (not-
ing that the jury’s function in “both civil and criminal proceedings . . . was to protect ordinary individ-
uals against governmental overreaching”). 
 32 R. Jack Ayres, Jr., Judicial Nullification of the Right to Trial by Jury by “Evolving” Standards 
of Appellate Review, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 337, 342 (2008) (arguing that the jury right “is a direct pro-
tection against the tyranny of potential elitism or aristocratic decision making by the judicial officers 
of the government itself”); see also Renée Lettow Lerner, The Rise of Directed Verdict: Jury Power in 
Civil Cases Before the Federal Rules of 1938, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448, 451 (2013) (noting that 
around 1791, “major figures in the American legal world lauded the power of civil juries as a bulwark 
against tyranny”). 
 33 Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury, supra note 28, at 1418. 
 34 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 260 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Win-
throp trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 264. 
 37 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 
(1991) (“[W]ith the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their 
most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.”); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 
522, 529 (1975) (“[T]he jury plays a political function in the administration of the law . . . .”). Justice 
David Souter, however, has pointed out the “important” differences “between jury decisionmaking 
and political decisionmaking.” See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1051 n.5 (1996) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing). For example, political decision making is motivated by subjective demands and values, whereas 
jury decision making should be a neutral analysis. See id. 
 38 Vikram David Amar, Jury Service As Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 203, 205 (1995). 
 39 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1997) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
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clause,40 which in criminal cases requires a witness against the defendant 
“to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and 
judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his 
testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”41 But the maxim carries equal 
weight in civil cases, as reflected in evidentiary rules that impose strict lim-
its on the right to introduce testimony in a form other than a live witness.42 
Put simply, “the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial 
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavaila-
ble to testify.”43 
One of the critical reasons for requiring live testimony is to permit the 
fact finder to observe the witness’s demeanor, including the witness’s appear-
ance and behavior.44 These attributes are often apparent from the witness’s di-
rect testimony and are perhaps even more important on cross-examination, 
which is a key method for evaluating the witness’s veracity.45 Cross-
examination presents the opportunity not only to elicit helpful testimony, but 
also to impeach a witness through demeanor.46 Clarence Darrow famously con-
fronted an exceptionally dirty and disheveled man by doing nothing but “re-
quest that the witness stand up and turn around.”47 Decisions through the 
1970s frequently emphasized the importance of resolving cases through live 
testimony, rather than paper motions, precisely because of the role that de-
meanor evidence plays in credibility determinations.48 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”). 
 41 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895). 
 42 See FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4) (authorizing the use of a nonparty’s deposition in a civil proceeding 
only when the witness is unavailable to testify live, noting “the importance of live testimony in open 
court”); FED. R. EVID. 804 (authorizing the admission of certain kinds of hearsay only if the declarant 
is not available to testify live). 
 43 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004). 
 44 Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242–43; James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903, 
907 (2000) (noting that demeanor is evaluated based on characteristics such as “the witness’s dress, 
attitude, behavior, manner, tone of voice, grimaces, gestures, and appearance”). 
 45 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (describing cross-examination as the “greatest 
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth” (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 
(Chadbourn rev. 1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 46 E.g., Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 874 (2d Cir. 1949) (reasoning that “demeanor may be the 
most effective impeachment”). 
 47 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Demeanor Impeachment: Law and Tactics, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
183, 226–27 (1985) (citing 3 FRANCIS X. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS § 409, at 751 
(encyclopedic ed. 1960)). The witness was described as appearing to be a “habitual drunkard” whose 
hair was “tangled and matted,” whose clothes were “covered with dirt and grease,” and whose “huge 
hands . . . were covered with grime.” BUSCH, supra, at 751. Darrow’s approach left quite an impres-
sion, prompting one scholar to note that “[n]o conceivable cross-examination could have been more 
effective.” Id. 
 48 See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 176 (1970) (Black, J., concurring) (“The 
right to confront, cross-examine and impeach adverse witnesses is one of the most fundamental rights 
sought to be preserved by the Seventh Amendment provision for jury trials in civil cases.”); Sartor v. 
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C. The Seeds of Change 
These foundational principles underlying the right to a jury trial are per-
haps responsible for the wide latitude that juries historically enjoyed in resolv-
ing disputes.49 A jury trial was considered the best mechanism for doing so.50 It 
served as the “guarantor of fairness, a bulwark against tyranny, and a source of 
civic values.”51 
But somewhere along the way, something changed. Two hundred and twen-
ty-five years removed from the environment that informed the Constitutional 
Convention,52 most Americans have grown relatively unconcerned with gov-
ernmental tyranny and disenfranchisement.53 For example, Americans accepted, 
however begrudgingly, a judicial decree rendered by Republican-appointed Su-
preme Court justices resolving the 2000 presidential election in favor of the Re-
                                                                                                                           
Ark. Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 628–29 (1944) (noting that defendants “may not withdraw 
[their] witnesses from cross-examination,” that cross-examination is “the best method yet devised for 
testing trustworthiness of testimony,” and that witness “credibility and the weight given to their opin-
ions is to be determined, after trial, in the regular manner”); Cedillo v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge & Struc-
tural Iron Workers, Local Union No. 1, 603 F.2d 7, 11 (7th Cir. 1979) (“[A]s a general principle, ques-
tions of motive and intent are particularly inappropriate for summary adjudication.”); Dyer, 201 F.2d 
at 269 (“The course of procedural reform has all indeed been towards bringing witnesses before the 
tribunal when it is possible . . . because only so can the ‘demeanor’ evidence be brought before the 
tribunal.”); Colby, 178 F.2d at 873 (“For only in [a trial on oral testimony] can the trier of the facts 
(trial judge or jury) observe the witnesses’ demeanor; and that demeanor—absent, of course, when 
trial is by affidavit or deposition—is recognized as an important clue to witness’ credibility.”). Courts 
widely held that a movant for summary judgment in a state-of-mind case “must submit himself to 
cross-examination in open court” without regard to the evidence; otherwise, because the nonmovant 
may not be able to proffer much controverting evidence, the movant could prevail solely based on 
bare denials. John A. Bauman, A Rationale of Summary Judgment, 33 IND. L.J. 467, 492–93 (1958); 
see Peckham v. Ronrico Corp., 171 F.2d 653, 658 (1st Cir. 1948); Hatfield v. Barnes, 168 P.2d 552, 
553 (Colo. 1946). But some commentators attacked this approach, arguing that it allows a plaintiff to 
avoid its burden of “offer[ing] affirmative evidence supporting each element of its claim in order to 
get to the jury.” David A. Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibility in the Summary Judgment Con-
text: A Better Approach, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 774, 797 (1983). Under this view, enabling plaintiffs to 
reach trial “merely by suggesting that the defendant’s affidavits may be false” would “make a mock-
ery of the summary judgment procedure under Rule 56.” Id. (quoting Topp-Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola 
Co., 185 F. Supp. 700, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 49 See Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury, supra note 28, at 1412 (characterizing the jury 
as exercising “wild and untamed discretion”). 
 50 Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing? What’s Happened to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 588 (2011) (noting that the jury trial was con-
sidered the “gold resolution standard”). 
 51 TXO Prod., 509 U.S. at 473 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 52 Congress adopted the Bill of Rights, and submitted it to the states for ratification, in 1789. 1 
Stat. 97 (1789). 
 53 Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 
2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 896 (“To rail against central tyranny today is to be considerably more para-
noid than were the Founders, given the general track record of the United States since 1787.”). 
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publican candidate.54 And they reacted nonchalantly to the revelation that the 
U.S. government has been spying on its own citizens.55 Concerns that individual 
citizens are the safeguards of liberty no longer animate the American populace. 
Some commentators have thus suggested that our reverence for civil juries is 
misguided.56 Although some continue to embrace the jury system as a check on 
executive and legislative power,57 the average citizen has become largely apa-
thetic to the values underpinning the jury trial, just as many have become apa-
thetic to the political process generally.58 
Courts, in turn, began to encroach on the absolute right of a jury trial, at 
least in complex cases. In 1970, in Ross v. Bernhard, the Supreme Court 
obliquely suggested that the right to a jury under the Seventh Amendment can 
be tempered by considerations of “the practical abilities and limitations of ju-
ries.”59 In 1980, the Third Circuit went a step further, articulating a complexity 
exception to the Seventh Amendment for cases in which a jury trial would 
compromise a party’s right to due process under the Fifth Amendment.60 The 
retreat was not uniform; the Ninth Circuit expressed offense at any suggestion 
that jurors were incapable of deciding even complex cases,61 and the Federal 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Karl S. Coplan, Legal Realism, Innate Morality, and the Structural Role of the Supreme 
Court in the U.S. Constitutional Democracy, 86 TUL. L. REV. 181, 210 (2011) (“With [Gore’s] popular 
vote victory and the presidency at stake, it is telling that . . . the nation . . . accepted the Supreme 
Court’s verdict on the election as final with barely a whimper.”). 
 55 See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, In U.S., News of Surveillance Effort Is Met with Some Concern but 
Little Surprise, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2013, at A12. 
 56 Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury, supra note 28, at 1422 (arguing that Americans’ 
“devotion to the civil jury” has become “nothing more than fetishism”); see also id. at 1426 
(“[O]pponents of the jury claim that it has become a sacred cow, and demand an end to America’s 
‘almost superstitious reverence for the jury as an institution.’” (quoting Edson R. Sunderland, The 
Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MICH. L. REV. 302, 302 (1915))). 
 57 E.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, Fear and Trembling in Criminal Judgment, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
827, 845 (2010) (book review); see also Amar, supra note 31, at 1183 (describing the jury’s role in 
thwarting overreach by government officials). 
 58 Adam Feit, Tort Reform, One State at a Time: Recent Developments in Class Actions and Com-
plex Litigation in New York, Illinois, Texas, and Florida, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 899, 946 (2008) (noting 
“general apathy toward jury service, and even toward voting”). 
 59 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). 
 60 In re Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1088 (noting that due process precludes a trial by jury when 
the jury is unable to make a rational decision because it cannot fairly and reasonably assess evidence 
or apply the relevant legal rules); accord Cotten v. Witco Chem. Corp., 651 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 
Unit A July 1981) (noting the very high standard required to preclude jury trial). See generally U.S. 
CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”). 
 61 Fabrikant, 609 F.2d at 429–30 (arguing that the notion that “jurors are incapable of understand-
ing complicated matters . . . improperly demeans the intelligence of the citizens of this Nation”); ac-
cord Cotten, 651 F.2d at 277 (Tate, J., concurring) (opining that the Seventh Amendment leaves no 
room for an “uncharted exception” to the right of a jury trial, even in complex cases). 
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Circuit suggested that it would be improper to determine whether a case was 
suitable for a complexity exception.62 
If the costs and complexities of modern litigation have created a tension 
between the Fifth Amendment due process right and the Seventh Amendment 
jury-trial right, one might have expected a robust debate about how to strike 
the right balance between them.63 Although a few scholars have considered the 
wisdom of a complexity exception,64 wide discussion about the constitutionali-
ty of that solution has faded.65 And despite a circuit split that has existed for 
over thirty years, the Supreme Court has never directly taken up the question, 
and few in the legal community expect it to do so.66 Nor has there been any 
meaningful, thorough debate about whether the financial burdens of litigation 
outweigh the benefits of the Seventh Amendment.67 Such a debate would be 
                                                                                                                           
 62 SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that 
such a determination would be “at best an unseemly judicial exercise”). 
 63 Cf. William R. Long, Note, Requiem for Robertson: The Life and Death of a Free-Speech 
Framework in Oregon, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 101, 107 (1998) (“A balancing approach arises when 
a court believes that two constitutional rights are in conflict requiring the weighing of various factors 
in order to determine which right should prevail.”). Only one court has suggested a balancing test to 
weigh the competing interests of the Fifth and Seventh Amendments. See In re Antitrust Litig., 631 
F.2d at 1084. According to the Third Circuit: 
If a particular lawsuit is so complex that a jury cannot satisfy this requirement of due 
process . . . , we face a conflict between the requirements of the fifth and seventh 
amendments. In this situation, we must balance the constitutionally protected interest, 
as they are implicated in this particular context, and reach the most reasonable accom-
modation between the two constitutional provisions. 
Id. 
 64 See, e.g., Jarod S. Gonzalez, SOX, Statutory Interpretation, and the Seventh Amendment: Sar-
banes-Oxley Act Whistleblower Claims and Jury Trials, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 25, 79–81 (2006) 
(collecting and describing scholarship); Joseph A. Miron, Jr., Note, The Constitutionality of a Com-
plexity Exception to the Seventh Amendment, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 865, 865 n.1 (1998) (collecting 
scholarship). Judge Richard Posner observed that jurors evaluate evidence more effectively than judg-
es in injury, simple contracts, and criminal cases, but “are at sea” in complex commercial cases. Jef-
frey Cole, Economics of Law: An Interview with Judge Posner, 22 LITIG. 23, 66–67 (1995). 
 65 See JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERICAN 
SPECIAL JURIES 196 (2006) (acknowledging that debate over the complexity exception has not gained 
traction). 
 66 N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, Jurors and Scientific Causation: What Don’t They Know, 
and What Can Be Done About It?, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 433, 438 (2012) (observing that most commen-
tators are doubtful that the Court will resolve the constitutionality of a complexity exception). 
 67 Of course, there are criticisms of the costs of the jury system. See, e.g., SAUL M. KASSIN & 
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 3 
(1988); Edward J. Devitt, Federal Civil Jury Trials Should Be Abolished, 60 A.B.A. J. 570, 571 (1974) 
(arguing that the jury system creates a backlog in the courts); Fleming James, Jr., Trial by Jury and the 
New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 1022, 1026 (1936) (asserting that the jury system is 
expensive and causes delay). Critics have portrayed the system as anachronistic, unduly expensive, 
burdensome to jurors, and partially responsible for the clogging of civil courts. See, e.g., KASSIN & 
WRIGHTSMAN, supra, at 3; Devitt, supra, at 571; James, supra, at 1026. Yet there has been no thor-
ough analysis of the costs and benefits and certainly no movement, based on such an analysis, to re-
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problematic at the judicial level given the Court’s recognition that the right to a 
jury trial “cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by jury impairs the 
efficiency or fairness of . . . justice.”68 
Instead of engaging in a full-scale debate about the relative costs and ben-
efits of the jury system, the Court has adopted what it calls “gatekeeping” 
functions.69 These procedural devices are apparently designed to reduce the 
number of cases that go to trial, with the ostensible justification that the Sev-
enth Amendment is not implicated at all.70 But as the next Part demonstrates, 
the Seventh Amendment is very much implicated; these decisions have cut 
away, incrementally but steadily, at the jury’s historic power to draw inferences 
from circumstantial evidence. 
II. THE DEMISE OF THE JURY’S INFERENCE-DRAWING FUNCTION 
Inferences are conclusions that “common experience” permits us to draw 
from circumstantial evidence.71 Jurors have a duty to rely on their experiences 
                                                                                                                           
peal the Seventh Amendment. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 338 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the Seventh Amendment “was included in the Bill of Rights in 1791 and . . . has not since been re-
pealed in the only manner provided by the Constitution for repeal of its provisions”). 
 68 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313. The 2004 Supreme Court decision in Blakely addressed the right to a 
jury in criminal cases under the Sixth Amendment, but “there is no doctrinal basis to distinguish be-
tween the Sixth Amendment analysis in Blakely and a Seventh Amendment analysis—efficiency either 
is a value of constitutional dignity or it is not.” Kenneth S. Klein, Why Federal Rule of Evidence 403 
Is Unconstitutional, and Why That Matters, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1077, 1114 (2013). 
 69 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 327 n.8 (2007) (collecting cas-
es); see also, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (“[U]nder 
the Rules [of Evidence,] the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence 
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”); Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 321 
(1967) (explaining that judgment as a matter of law does not violate the Seventh Amendment). One 
commentator notes that “[t]he Court has given primacy to gate keeping” by “accord[ing] efficiency 
and cost reduction the status of primary systemic objectives.” Miller, supra note 50, at 597. Thus, the 
Court’s procedural developments “explicitly enhance the judge’s role as gatekeeper.” Levin, supra 
note 15, at 148. Pleading, in particular, now “serves as the gatekeeper for civil litigation.” Clermont & 
Yeazell, supra note 21, at 824; infra notes 94–179 and accompanying text (describing these gatekeep-
ing functions based on pleading standards in detail). 
 70 See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 327 n.8 (“In numerous contexts, gatekeeping judicial determinations 
prevent submission of claims to a jury’s judgment without violating the Seventh Amendment.”); see 
also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437 (2001) (holding that judi-
cial review of juries’ punitive-damage awards do not implicate the Seventh Amendment “[b]ecause 
the jury’s award of punitive damages does not constitute a finding of ‘fact’”). A cynical student of 
legislative history would note that the statute authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules at 
one time provided explicitly that procedural rules could not supplant “the right of trial by jury as at 
common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment” —language that was stricken in a 1988 
amendment. See G. Thomas Eisele, Differing Visions—Differing Values: A Comment on Judge Par-
ker’s Reformation Model for Federal District Courts, 46 SMU L. REV. 1935, 1944–45 (1993); see also 
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2072, 62 Stat. 869, 961 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(2012)) (giving the Court authority to “prescribe general rules of practice and procedure”). 
 71 See, e.g., Paulino v. Harrison, 542 F.3d 692, 700 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Radomsky v. United 
States, 180 F.2d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1950)); United States v. Scruggs, 549 F.2d 1097, 1104 (6th Cir. 
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in determining whether to infer a particular fact from evidence that may sup-
port various alternative facts.72 Drawing inferences involves the mental pro-
cess of abduction73 and requires us to draw on our reason and experience in 
evaluating circumstantial evidence.74 Although the distinction between direct 
evidence and circumstantial evidence is not as straightforward as the law 
sometimes suggests,75 for purposes of this Article, we can illustrate the differ-
ence by using the example of the child who stole the cookie. If questioned on 
the witness stand, the child might deny the wrongdoing, and that denial would 
be direct evidence of her innocence. In contrast, a deceitful demeanor or in-
consistent testimony could be circumstantial evidence tending to prove that the 
denial was a lie.76 And the lie, in turn, could be circumstantial evidence tend-
                                                                                                                           
1977). To evaluate circumstantial evidence, a factfinder must draw an “inference based on human 
experience that a certain circumstance is usually present when another certain circumstance or set of 
circumstances is present.” Radomsky, 180 F.2d at 783. 
 72 Schnapper, supra note 3, at 280 (“The task of the jury . . . is to decide what occurred by draw-
ing inferences about the disputed events from non-conclusive evidence.”). 
 73 See generally Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 
27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 228 (2008) (“Abduction involves inferring a conclusion that would explain the 
given premises. The common variety is a causal explanation—one infers from a given effect (the 
premise) to a causal proposition (the conclusion) that would explain, or best explain, that effect.”). 
 74 See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943) (noting that “the jury is permitted to infer 
from one fact the existence of another essential to guilt, if reason and experience support the infer-
ence”). 
 75 Circumstantial evidence traditionally requires the use of inferences to reach a conclusion rele-
vant to the dispute, whereas direct evidence establishes the conclusion without resort to inference 
drawing. E.g., Radomsky, 180 F.2d at 783; Robert P. Burns, Some Realism (and Idealism) About the 
Trial, 31 GA. L. REV. 715, 762 n.171 (1997); Fleming James, Jr., Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-
Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REV. 218, 219 (1961). Scholars often observe, 
however, that even direct evidence requires the use of inferences, including inferences going to the 
competency and accuracy of the witness. See Burns, supra, at 762 n.171; James, supra, at 219 (“In the 
final analysis all proof requires some process of inference, before it can be translated into an actual 
decision by the trier.”). One recent commentator has thus noted the “illusory nature of the direct-
circumstantial distinction.” Richard K. Greenstein, Determining Facts: The Myth of Direct Evidence, 
45 HOUS. L. REV. 1801, 1804 (2009); accord Burns, supra, at 762 n.171 (arguing that “the probative 
value of all evidence is circumstantial”). Although I agree that the line between direct and circumstan-
tial evidence is murky, I use those terms in this Article because the encroachments on the jury’s power 
to resolve competing inferences has been more pronounced with respect to evidence that we tradition-
ally characterize as circumstantial. 
 76 See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 382 (1955) (indicating that demeanor does not 
impugn credibility unless it is “shifty or evasive”). The value of demeanor evidence began to come 
under closer scrutiny in 1991, when Olin Guy Wellborn III produced empirical evidence showing that 
“ordinary people cannot make effective use of demeanor in deciding whether to believe a witness.” 
Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1991). Jeremy Blumenthal called 
it “unforgiveable” that the legal system did not adjust to these research findings. Jeremy A. Blumen-
thal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness 
Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1204 (1993). Unforgiveable or not, this Article starts from the pre-
sumption that demeanor evidence remains a valuable tool in credibility determinations, as the case law 
certainly continues to recognize. See, e.g., United States v. Rosen, 716 F.3d 691, 698 (2d Cir. 2013); 
Hernandez v. Valley View Hosp. Ass’n, 684 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Seng Tan, 
674 F.3d 103, 108 (1st Cir. 2011). Indeed, Max Minzner’s updated research suggests a “far more com-
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ing to prove that the child stole the cookie. In this simplistic example, then, the 
direct evidence would point in one direction, whereas the circumstantial evi-
dence would point in the other. 
In 1944, in Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Railway, the Supreme Court 
explained that “select[ing] from among conflicting inferences” was “[t]he very 
essence of [the jury’s] function” and admonished courts not to substitute their 
own inferences for those drawn by the jury.77 Modern commentators have 
agreed that preserving the power to draw inferences is crucial to maintaining a 
significant right to a jury trial.78 One can hardly argue with that truism. Yet the 
courts have chipped away so extensively at that meaningful right that it now 
runs the risk of becoming meaningless. 
This Part focuses on three specific aspects of inference drawing that 
courts have improperly siphoned away from juries: (1) the power to consider 
inferences that judges deem implausible;79 (2) the power to decide between 
two inferences that judges conclude are equally plausible;80 and (3) the power 
to rely on inferences, drawn from witness prevarication, that contradict the 
direct evidence.81 In each area, courts have arrogated to themselves a factfind-
ing function that would have historically belonged to the jury. 
A. The Problem of So-Called “Implausible” Inferences 
Even in circumstantial-evidence cases, the party with the burden of proof 
must carry it; the party must establish that the available inferences in its favor 
are more likely to be accurate than the available inferences that are not.82 And 
the jury’s historic prerogative to select from among competing inferences has 
                                                                                                                           
plex” picture than Professors Wellborn and Blumenthal portrayed. Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using 
Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2564 (2008); accord Timony, supra note 
44, at 934–35 (critiquing research methods of studies that find laypeople are not capable of judging 
credibility based on demeanor). 
 77 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944); see also id. (“Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside 
the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or be-
cause judges feel that other results are more reasonable.”). 
 78 See, e.g., Dorsaneo, supra note 29, at 1699 (“If the inferences drawn by the jury could be cast 
aside by trial judges or appellate courts merely because the judges regard the jury’s inferences . . . as 
less convincing or reasonable than competing inferences, the right to trial by jury would be rendered 
considerably less meaningful.”); Miller, supra note 9, at 1120–21; Schnapper, supra note 3, at 281. 
 79 See infra notes 82–134 and accompanying text. 
 80 See infra notes 135–179 and accompanying text. 
 81 See infra notes 180–261 and accompanying text. 
 82 See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009) (holding that in an age-
discrimination case, the plaintiff must prove that discrimination led to adverse employment action by 
a preponderance of the evidence, regardless of whether it is direct or circumstantial); Pardo & Allen, 
supra note 73, at 238 (“If the proffered explanations truly are equally bad (or good), including addi-
tionally constructed ones, judgment will (and should) go against the party with the burden of persua-
sion.”). 
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always required the choices to be “rational”83 or “reasonable”;84 they cannot be 
based on “conjecture and speculation.”85 But that standard is easier to articu-
late than to apply. Although courts purport to precisely weigh the relative like-
lihoods of competing inferences, accurate or consistent methods of doing so 
typically do not exist.86 Thus, courts have been unable to clearly delineate the 
boundary between “rational inference” and “speculation.”87 And too often 
courts invoke the prohibition against speculation as a basis for reversing a ver-
dict merely because they disagree with it.88 Nowhere is that trend more blatant 
than in the realm of inferences that courts conclude are too implausible to per-
mit a jury to consider in the first place. Judges, like jurors, possess intuitions 
shaped by individual experience, so whatever personal biases they have sub-
consciously threaten to skew their careful determinations of whether inferences 
are plausible.89 
                                                                                                                           
 83 E.g., Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Griffith, 159 U.S. 603, 608 (1895). 
 84 E.g., Tennant, 321 U.S. at 35. The Court explained that whether or not the jury’s inferences 
were reasonable is “the focal point of judicial review.” Id. 
 85 E.g., Mich. Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 74 (1913). 
 86 James, supra note 75, at 221–22 (noting that “[t]he test of rationality is usually expressed in 
terms of probabilities,” thus creating a pretense of “mathematical precision” that is spurious without 
corresponding “quantitative data”). Richard Friedman has endorsed “naked statistical evidence” as a 
basis for “satisfy[ing] the plaintiff’s burden of production.” Richard D. Friedman, Comment, General-
ized Inferences, Individual Merits, and Jury Discretion, 66 B.U. L. REV. 509, 513 (1986). For exam-
ple, where the statistical evidence demonstrates that “90 percent of the vehicles bearing the Hertz logo 
are owned by Hertz,” the plaintiff could reach the jury on the question of ownership merely by prov-
ing that a particular truck bore that logo, even in the face of contrary evidence. Kaminsky v. Hertz 
Corp., 288 N.W.2d 426, 427 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). But most cases do not lend themselves to that sort 
of statistical quantification of likelihood. See Friedman, supra, at 518. Instead, the probability of most 
facts is “in the mind of the beholder.” Id. 
 87 Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1193 n.15 (1979) (“Courts have found the difference between rational inference 
and speculation difficult to define.”); see also Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 672 (6th Cir. 
2010) (“[W]here one person sees speculation, . . . another may see knowledge . . . .”). 
 88 See J.E.K. Indus., Inc. v. Shoemaker, 763 F.2d 348, 353 (8th Cir. 1985) (upholding the trial 
court’s decision to grant a directed verdict based on the argument that the jury cannot rely on specula-
tion); Romero v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 749 F.2d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affirming the trial court’s 
grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the inferences favoring the plaintiff were 
“sheer conjecture”); see also Schnapper, supra note 3, at 287 (observing that appellate courts insert 
their own assessments of evidence by labeling the jury’s conclusions as “speculative” and suggesting 
that the jury simply guessed because it could not determine the facts (citing Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 
743 F.2d 195, 198 (3d Cir. 1984))). 
 89 Miller, supra note 9, at 1071 (“Judges are human, and their personal sense of whether a plain-
tiff’s claim seems ‘implausible’ can subconsciously infiltrate even the most careful analysis.”). This 
threat is inevitable because “a judge cannot help but be influenced by his or her cultural background.” 
Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 107, 108 (2010). Accordingly, 
judges “are constantly asserting or assuming broad generalizations about human behavior and all sorts 
of other matters which either rest on their own very fallible notions about such things (often re-
flect[ing] veritable old wives’ tales current in the culture of the community), or spring from considera-
tions of policy and expediency.” James, supra note 75, at 222. 
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Historically, some judges were perhaps overly deferential to the jury’s 
factfinding role even in the face of allegations that strained credulity and were, 
on balance, implausible by any rational standard. For example, Justice Felix 
Frankfurter observed in a 1951 oral argument that he “‘would give a jury . . . 
every possible leeway to believe implausible stories . . . .’”90 And in Arnstein v. 
Porter, a 1946 copyright-infringement case against composer Cole Porter, the 
Second Circuit held that a jury should be permitted to accept or reject infer-
ences that seemed fanciful or far-fetched.91 Arnstein claimed that several of 
Porter’s most famous tunes plagiarized Arnstein’s prior works, postulating that 
Porter gained the requisite access to Arnstein’s previously unpublished musical 
compositions by hiring “stooges” to stalk him and burglarize his apartment.92 
A divided court held that the inferences Arnstein asked the court to draw, 
though “fantastic,” should be evaluated by the jury.93 
But Arnstein was decided more than sixty years ago, and the landscape 
has changed; we now live in a world where claims are either “plausible” or 
“implausible.” The terms gained notoriety as a result of the recent pair of Su-
preme Court cases that heightened pleading requirements. The Court’s “block-
buster decisions”94 in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly in 2007 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal in 2009 are usually considered as a pair—so much so that lawyers fre-
quently conjoin their names into “Twiqbal.”95 
Although both cases discuss plausibility at the pleading stage, they do so 
in importantly different ways. As I demonstrate below, Twombly is less about a 
rejection of implausible inferences and more about a rejection of cases prem-
ised on equally plausible inferences.96 So for the moment, I set Twombly aside. 
Iqbal has a more direct impact on the value of ostensibly implausible in-
ferences. And Iqbal is particularly problematic because of the Court’s apparent 
reluctance to announce candidly the path it followed to its holding. In Iqbal, 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: “Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,” 64 HARV. L. 
REV. 1233, 1246 (1951) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 
U.S. 498 (1951) (No. 42)). 
 91 154 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 92 Id. at 467 (internal quotation marks omitted). Arnstein’s theory was that Porter directed the men 
“‘to follow [Arnstein], watch [him], and live in the same apartment with [him],’ and that [his] room 
had been ransacked on several occasions.” Id. 
 93 Id. at 469 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 94 Edward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of “Plausible Pleadings”: An Introduction to the 
Symposium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2 (2010). 
 95 E.g., Dodson, New Pleading, supra note 12, at 54; Alex Glashausser, The Extension Clause and 
the Supreme Court’s Jurisdictional Independence, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1225, 1236 n.60 (2012). See gener-
ally Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
Twombly and Iqbal “have already spawned multiple interpretive essays searching to explain or ration-
alize the ambiguities presented by these cases.” Brunet, supra note 94, at 2. Indeed, as of March 3, 
2014, the “Journals and Law Reviews” database on Westlaw had captured 2861 articles that mention 
Twombly and/or Iqbal, of which 252 include one or both case names in the title. 
 96 See infra notes 169–176 and accompanying text. 
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the plaintiff alleged that high-ranking government officials adopted a discrimi-
natory policy of confining men based upon their “religion, race, and/or nation-
al origin” in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.97 The Court held 
that the inferences of high-level policy decisions were based on “bare asser-
tions,” unsupported by the pleaded facts, and could not overcome the govern-
ment’s motion to dismiss.98 The Court stressed that it did not reject these infer-
ences because they were “unrealistic or nonsensical,” but instead because they 
contained no factual grounding.99 Nevertheless, even a cursory review of the 
pleaded allegations belies that rationale, as the dissenting opinion explained.100 
The actual basis of the Iqbal holding, therefore, must be the Court’s desire 
to wrest from the jury the ability to draw certain inferences that appear “ex-
travagantly fanciful.”101 Indeed, in its briefing, the defendants invited the Court 
to do just that.102 Perhaps the best evidence of the Court’s true holding is its 
admonition that a trial court, in evaluating plausibility, should “draw on its ju-
dicial experience and common sense.”103 That language is frighteningly analo-
gous to the “experience . . . and common sense” that juries were historically 
required to employ in drawing factual inferences.104 In short, the implausible 
aspect of Iqbal is the Court’s reasoning, not the plaintiff’s pleading. 
Iqbal has been resoundingly criticized for, among other things, failing to 
articulate a cohesive measure by which lower courts can differentiate between 
unsubstantiated conclusory allegations (apparently implausible under Iqbal) 
and factually detailed assertions sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss 
(apparently plausible).105 But the distinction between “plausible” and “implau-
                                                                                                                           
 97 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (quoting Complaint and Jury Demand ¶ 65, at 12, Elmaghraby v. Ash-
croft, No. CV 04 1809 (E.D.N.Y. May 3, 2004), 2004 WL 3756439, ¶ 65). 
 98 Id. at 681. 
 99 Id. (“It is the conclusory nature of respondent’s allegations, rather than their extravagantly 
fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.”). 
 100 See id. at 694–97 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the specific factual allegations were 
unlikely but certainly not absurd). 
 101 See id. at 681 (majority opinion). 
 102 Id. at 695 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting the defendants’ argument “that Iqbal’s claims are 
implausible because such high-ranking officials ‘tend not to be personally involved in the specific 
actions of lower-level officers down the bureaucratic chain of command.’” (quoting Brief for the Peti-
tioners at 28, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL 4063957, at *28). 
 103 Id. at 679 (majority opinion). 
 104 See Standard Oil Co. v. Van Etten, 107 U.S. 325, 334 (1882) (“The very spirit of trial by jury 
is that the experience, practical knowledge of affairs, and common sense of jurors, may be appealed 
to, to mediate the inconsistencies of the evidence, and reconcile the extravagances of opposing theo-
ries of the parties.”). 
 105 E.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Mer-
its: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 334 (2013) (“And 
what does [plausibility] mean?”); Henry S. Noyes, The Rise of the Common Law of Federal Pleading: 
Iqbal, Twombly, and the Application of Judicial Experience, 56 VILL. L. REV. 857, 870 (2012) (“The 
Court . . . provided little guidance on how to draw the line between plausible and implausible 
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sible,” suddenly in judicial vogue,106 is nothing more than the age-old distinc-
tion between “reasonable” and “speculative.” In that sense, the Iqbal problem 
is only one manifestation of a larger problem that arises whenever courts un-
dertake to determine whether an inference is reasonable or whether a “reason-
able jury” could draw it. Just as Iqbal fails to elucidate the standard for distin-
guishing between plausible and implausible, the courts have provided no crite-
ria to evaluate what constitutes a reasonable jury.107 
Nor does this undefined standard infect only the pleading stage; it also 
applies at the summary-judgment stage108 and at trial.109 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court itself has undertaken that sort of determination several times in sum-
mary-judgment cases, including as far back as 1968, when the Court, in First 
National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., rejected an antitrust claim by 
finding it “much more plausible” that the defendant’s interests “coincided, ra-
ther than conflicted, with” the plaintiff’s.110 And in 1986, in Matsushita Elec-
tric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., the Court held that a claim can be 
“implausible” if it “is one that simply makes no economic sense.”111 In other 
words, a claim can be implausible if the plaintiff’s theory of liability requires 
                                                                                                                           
claims.”); Michael S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil Litigation, 51 
B.C. L. REV. 1451, 1459 (2010) (“[T]he content of ‘plausibility’ was left obscure.”). 
 106 See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 21, at 851–52 (noting that before Twombly and Iqbal, the 
term “plausibility” was not only “new to the world of pleading, it was largely new to the world of civil 
procedure”). 
 107 Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 760 (2009) 
(“[N]either the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have defined the ‘reasonable jury.’”). Although the 
Court has not defined “reasonable jury,” it has held “that ‘no reasonable juror’ could have formed 
beliefs contrary to the Court’s own,” which “inevitably call[s] into question the integrity, intelligence, 
and competence of identifiable subcommunities whose members in fact [hold] those dissenting be-
liefs.” Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of 
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 897 (2009); see also infra notes 276–280 and accom-
panying text (describing the Court’s excessively narrow interpretation of plausible inferences in Scott 
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)). 
 108 See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (holding that summary 
judgment is improper if “a reasonable jury” could find for the nonmovant); see also Clermont & 
Yeazell, supra note 21, at 833–34 (observing that both pleading challenges under Iqbal and summary 
judgment motions “ask whether a factual assertion is reasonably possible”). 
 109 See, e.g., Brady v. S. Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479–80 (1943) (holding that a directed verdict is 
proper when there is only “one reasonable conclusion” the jury could reach); see also Pardo, supra 
note 105, at 1453 (“Several scholars have already noted similarities between both the ‘plausibility’ 
pleading standard and the ‘reasonable jury’ standard . . . .”). 
 110 391 U.S. 253, 285 (1968); see also infra notes 215–217 and accompanying text (noting that 
the Court in First National Bank of Arizona discounted the potential significance of witness credibility 
in evaluating the plausibility of available inferences). 
 111 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). One scholar notes that the Matsushita decision “uses variations on 
the word plausible an amazing thirteen times.” Brunet, supra note 94, at 4. Another observes that “the 
more one looks at [the Twombly and Iqbal] opinions, the more one finds striking parallels to the 
Court’s similar shift in the summary judgment context less than three decades ago.” Levin, supra note 
15, at 144. 
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the factfinder to conclude that the defendant acted against its economic inter-
ests.112 
These conceptions of implausibility necessarily employ individual value 
judgments.113 The majority in Iqbal rejected as “conclusory” the particularized 
factual allegations that diverged from their beliefs about the conduct of high-
ranking government officials.114 And, at a core level, the Matsushita majority 
made an “assumption” about what was in the defendant’s economic interests 
without explaining how or why there was no room for disagreement.115 Even 
members of the Supreme Court have disagreed about whether particular con-
duct makes “economic sense.”116 Not only can rational actors evaluate eco-
nomic interests differently, they also can (and do) make decisions that contra-
dict those interests. The external and internal circumstances that motivate peo-
ple are too complex to allow for a predictable and universal pattern of behav-
ior.117 For example, it appears implausible that a successful manufacturer would 
knowingly risk selling dangerous products118 or that a bank would make bad 
loans.119 And yet they do.120 Thus, as Justice Hugo Black noted in a 1968 dis-
                                                                                                                           
 112 See Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Sum-
mary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 227 (1993) (observing that the 
Court in Matsushita “denied that it was weighing competing interests” and instead “concluded that the 
plaintiffs had asked the court to draw irrational inferences”); see also Miller, supra note 105, at 311 
n.94 (observing that the Supreme Court “seemed to authorize” trial courts to dispose of implausible 
cases on summary judgment). Matsushita was the first part of a famous summary-judgment trilogy. 
See Miller, supra note 9, at 1029–34. The other two were Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242 (1986), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Miller, supra note 9, at 1034–41. 
 113 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 600 (White, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of permitting a 
trial judge to “decide for himself whether the weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff”). 
 114 A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 185, 196 (2010) (arguing that the majority rejected the plaintiff’s inferences because they 
were “inconsistent with their settled expectations,” thus necessitating “additional evidence to be taken 
seriously”). 
 115 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 604 (White, J., dissenting) (“I believe that this is an assumption 
that should be argued to the factfinder, not decided by the Court.”). 
 116 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 489 (1992) (Scal-
ia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s conclusion that a manufacturer’s “sale of distinctive repair 
parts” for its own brand of products created an unlawful monopoly). 
 117 Miller, supra note 9, at 1120–21 (“[M]otivation and other aspects of human behavior are . . . 
complicated . . . .”). 
 118 Id. at 1121 (“[I]t seems ‘implausible’ that a great manufacturing enterprise would vend a dele-
terious drug, insulating material, or a dangerous consumer product given the risks.”). 
 119 See Fifth Third Mortg. Co. v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 692 F.3d 507, 511 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting 
an inference of lending impropriety as economically “improbable” because a lender would not “lend 
money if it knew it would never get the money back”). 
 120 See, e.g., Tuscon Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 501 P.2d 936, 940–41 (Ariz. 1972) (en banc) (hold-
ing an adhesive manufacturer liable for selling, without adequate warning, cement that caused nearly 
immediate blindness when it contacted the plaintiff’s eyes); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Fi-
nancial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 267 (2012) (“The financial crisis of 
2007–2009 was preceded by a period of financial firms seeking short-term profit regardless of long-
term consequences.” (footnote omitted)). 
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sent, a judge’s conclusion about the motive for the defendant’s behavior is “nev-
er . . . the appropriate standard” for deciding to take a case from a jury.121 
Nevertheless, federal courts are increasingly willing to take ostensibly 
speculative or implausible claims from the jury by granting summary judgment 
in “complex actions[,]” “actions turning on state of mind[,]”122 or in cases in-
volving “concealed wrongdoing”123—a trend that has far-reaching tentacles. 
For example, the Court’s 2013 decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, borne of 
a desire to ensure that a jury awards “only those damages attributable”124 to the 
plaintiff’s theory of liability, casts doubt on the longstanding rule that a jury is 
free to infer the amount of a plaintiff’s “uncertain damages” once it finds in 
favor of the plaintiff on liability.125 Some courts, invoking prudential-standing 
rules,126 have dismissed complaints by concluding that a calculation of the 
plaintiff’s alleged damages would require conjecture on the jury’s part.127 The 
hostility toward implausible inferences is also at the core of the Supreme 
Court’s case law requiring trial courts to evaluate experts’ opinions before 
permitting them to testify; what is couched as an effort to cabin speculation128 
ultimately enables judges to invade the province of the jury by making the cru-
cial evaluations of expert credibility.129 
Even if the citizenry were willing (after honest debate) to relax the Sev-
enth Amendment in favor of competing considerations of efficiency and fair-
ness that underlie due process—and even if there were a consensus that taking 
inference-drawing tasks from juries is the proper way to meet those considera-
tions—there is no principled standard for concluding that an inference is too 
implausible for trial.130 Arnstein may be an extreme case, but it helps illustrate 
                                                                                                                           
 121 First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 391 U.S. at 305 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 122 Miller, supra note 9, at 1055; see also id. at 1055 nn.383–84 (collecting cases). See generally 
Bone, supra note 12, at 879 (noting that the problem of meritorious cases being screened out prema-
turely due to a defendant’s exclusive access to critical evidence is “likely to be especially serious for 
civil rights cases, and particularly cases like Iqbal involving state-of-mind elements”). 
 123 See Spencer, supra note 114, at 188. 
 124 See 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013). 
 125 See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1931) (rea-
soning that plaintiffs can recover damages that are “uncertain in amount” as long as they are the “cer-
tain result” of the defendant’s breach). 
 126 Prudential standing requires “that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests pro-
tected by the law invoked.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 127 See Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2007); see 
also Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 697 F.3d 387, 406 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting 
that the plaintiff’s damages calculation was “speculative”), aff’d on other grounds, No. 12-873, 2014 
WL 1168967 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2014). 
 128 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). 
 129 See Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191, 
217 (2003) (recognizing that a case may turn on the judge’s assessment of experts, essentially result-
ing in “a decision on the merits by the trial judge”). 
 130 The lack of a principled basis for determining implausibility is all the more troubling when 
one considers that the Court has expressed a greater willingness to accept a questionable inference of 
2014] The Death of Inference 455 
that the fact-specific nature of the inference-drawing function is incompatible 
with an across-the-board test. Commentators have certainly tried to formulate a 
standard. For example, one scholar suggests that an explanation is plausible if 
it “seems like it could be true.” 131 And another seems to embrace the Iqbal 
majority’s admonition that “[j]udicial experience must inform the district court 
about what is plausible in the context of each case.”132 But neither approach 
offers a sufficiently concrete basis for avoiding the vagaries, inconsistencies, 
and Seventh Amendment problems of judicial inference drawing. In short, 
judges severely undermine the right to a jury trial when they arrogate to them-
selves the right to select from among competing inferences,133 especially when 
they do so on paper motions that cannot convey witness demeanor.134 
B. The Problem of Equally Plausible Inferences 
In 1933, the Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania Railroad v. Chamber-
lain that the plaintiff, as a matter of law, could not establish a railroad employ-
ee’s causes of death if “proven facts give equal support to each of two incon-
sistent inferences.”135 Texas has dubbed this the “equal inference rule.”136 It 
bears a close relationship with a rule, followed in some jurisdictions, that pro-
                                                                                                                           
fraudulent conduct when drawn by a legislature rather than by a jury. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion 
Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 194 (2008) (upholding Indiana’s voter-identification law as a legit-
imate measure to prevent voter fraud even though “[t]he record contain[ed] no evidence of any such 
fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history”). At oral argument in Crawford, Chief 
Justice John Roberts suggested that it would be appropriate to defer to the Indiana legislature’s infer-
ence of voter fraud precisely “because . . . fraud [is] hard to detect.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 
19, Crawford, 553 U.S. 181 (Nos. 07-21, 07-25), 2008 WL 83835, at *19. 
 131 Pardo, supra note 105, at 1487–88. 
 132 Noyes, supra note 105, at 876. 
 133 Dorsaneo, supra note 29, at 1699 (noting that the “power of the jury to draw inferences from 
the evidence in deciding whether the applicable legal standard was violated . . . is the most critical 
component of the right to trial by jury”). 
 134 See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text (noting that the ability to observe witness de-
meanor is a crucial benefit of live testimony). 
 135 288 U.S. 333, 339 (1933). Chamberlain is by no means an aberration, even by the standards of 
the early-to-mid twentieth century. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Des Moines Nat’l Bank, 145 F. 
273, 280 (8th Cir. 1906) (explaining that a plaintiff has not proven its case when the jury chooses 
between equal conclusions); Burens v. Indus. Comm’n, 124 N.E.2d 724, 729 (Ohio 1955) (“[W]here 
. . . the facts give rise to two irreconcilable inferences, either of which is reasonable, the submission of 
a choice thereof to a jury is to permit the jury to indulge in speculation and conjecture.”). 
 136 See Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex. 2001) (Phillips, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The equal inference rule provides that a jury may not reasonably infer an ultimate 
fact from meager circumstantial evidence ‘which could give rise to any number of inferences, none 
more probable than another.’” (quoting Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex. 
1997))). 
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hibits a factfinder from aggregating inferences to reach an ultimate conclu-
sion.137 
Some argue that the equal-inference rule is harmful because it permits 
judges to disregard jury verdicts merely by characterizing competing infer-
ences as “equal.”138 And for many years, there were nuggets in the Supreme 
Court and lower-court decisions that contradicted Chamberlain; as I show be-
low, however, Twombly effectively squashed any opportunity for an equal-
inference case to succeed.139 
A handful of early twentieth-century Supreme Court cases after Chamber-
lain suggested deference to the jury’s assessment of competing inferences, 
even to the point of authorizing some degree of speculation to resolve a con-
flict among inferences that appeared to be equal. Perhaps no case better illus-
trates that deference than the Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in Lavender v. 
Kurn, where, as in Chamberlain, the jury had to determine the cause of a rail-
road employee’s death.140 If he died as a result of the defendant railroad’s neg-
ligence (as the plaintiff contended), the defendant would be liable to the plain-
tiff’s estate.141 If he was murdered (as the defendant contended), the defendant 
would not be liable.142 The Court recognized that the jury could reasonably 
infer that the defendant was murdered based on the facts.143 Nevertheless, the 
Court held that on appeal, the facts supporting the railroad’s murder theory 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See, e.g., Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943) (“[C]harges of conspira-
cy are not to be made out by piling inference upon inference.”); Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, 117 So. 
2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1960) (holding that a party with the burden of proof “cannot construct a further 
inference upon the initial inference in order to establish a further fact unless it can be found that the 
original, basic inference was established to the exclusion of all other reasonable inferences”). The 
Supreme Court of Ohio has noted that “the rule forbidding the stacking of an inference upon an infer-
ence is disfavored by scholars and many courts.” Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton Twp. Trs., 502 
N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ohio 1986). The court distinguished between reaching a conclusion by drawing an 
inference solely from another inference—which is impermissible stacking—and reaching a conclusion 
by considering the effect of two independently drawn inferences. Id. The court further observed that 
the rule prohibiting inference stacking is “too frequently misunderstood, or misused as a convenient 
means of excluding evidence regarded as too remote, speculative or uncertain to be of probative val-
ue.” Id. at 207–08. Conversely, other jurisdictions hold that it is permissible to aggregate inferences in 
reaching a conclusion about evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Eustace, 423 F.2d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 
1970) (“There is no validity to defendant’s argument that an inference cannot be based on another 
inference.”); Toliver v. United States, 224 F.2d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1955). 
 138 Dorsaneo, supra note 29, at 1710; see Ayres, supra note 32, at 480–81. 
 139 See infra notes 140–168 and accompanying text (discussing this contradiction to Chamber-
lain); infra notes 169–176 and accompanying text (discussing Twombly). 
 140 327 U.S. 645, 646 (1946) 
 141 Id. 
 142 See id. at 651. 
 143 Id. at 652. 
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were irrelevant.144 The Court noted that there was a “reasonable basis in the 
record for inferring” the railroad’s negligence.145 
But the Lavender Court did not end its analysis there. It went on to ad-
dress, and reject, the counter-argument that the plaintiff’s theory of injury “in-
volved speculation and conjecture”: 
Whenever facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that fair-
minded men may draw different inferences, a measure of specula-
tion and conjecture is required on the part of those whose duty it is 
to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the most 
reasonable inference. Only when there is a complete absence of pro-
bative facts to support the conclusion reached does a reversible error 
appear.146 
Under Lavender, then, a jury was free to employ some “speculation and 
conjecture” in selecting among competing inferences, so long as the ultimate 
choice found some support in the evidence.147 In essence, a jury was permitted 
to select among ostensibly equal inferences—precisely the opposite of the 
Chamberlain holding.148 In keeping with Lavender, one scholar noted in 1956 
that, in many cases, a conclusion can only be reached by relying on intuition or 
speculation after evaluating the evidence.149 
The Court twice reaffirmed the Lavender holding: once in 1957 in Webb 
v. Illinois Central Railroad150 and again in 1963 in Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad.151 Gallick is particularly instructive because of the importance the 
Court placed on the jury’s prerogative to select between two inferences that 
seemed equally logical. The case involved an individual who suffered a severe 
infection brought on by an insect bite.152 The case proceeded solely on evi-
dence that his employer failed to eradicate a pool of filthy, stagnant water that 
was infested with vermin and insects.153 The appellate court had overturned the 
verdict because there was no direct evidence that the pool of water, as opposed 
                                                                                                                           
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 653 (emphasis added). 
 147 See id.; Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the 
Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1353 (2005) (“[T]he fact that some conjecture was involved 
should not serve as an inherent barrier to a jury decision, for the simple reason that if there were no 
need for any conjecture, we would never need to send a case to a jury.”). 
 148 See Dorsaneo, supra note 29, at 1707–09. Compare Chamberlain, 288 U.S. at 339, with Lav-
ender, 327 U.S. at 653. 
 149 Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1024 (1956). 
 150 352 U.S. 512, 515 n.6 (1957) (upholding a jury verdict even though “[s]ome speculation may 
have entered into the jury’s decision”). 
 151 372 U.S. 108, 115–16 (1963). 
 152 Id. at 108. 
 153 Id. 
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to a nearby river or other nearby unsanitary land, had attracted the particular 
insect that bit the employee, and no direct evidence that the putrid water was 
the source of the infectious bacterium.154 The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the lower court had “improperly invaded the function and province of the 
jury” to infer the causal connections.155 In short, the insect may or may not 
have been attracted to the pool of water, but the jury was free to conclude, 
based solely on circumstantial evidence, that it was. And it may or may not 
have carried an infection from that pool, but the jury, again based solely on 
circumstantial evidence, was free to conclude that it did. 
Since then, Lavender has enjoyed only mixed endurance among lower 
courts, which have not consistently endorsed the jury’s power to select among 
equally plausible inferences. In the criminal context, courts have held that the 
presence of two plausible inferences—one pointing to guilt and the other to 
innocence—automatically raises a reasonable doubt and thus requires acquit-
tal.156 The flaw in this argument, of course, is that a jury may not necessarily 
agree with the court’s conclusion that the evidence is in “equipoise.”157 Thus, a 
jury may convict a defendant based on a reasonable inference of guilt, despite 
the court’s perception of an equally reasonable inference of innocence.158 
Those courts that require acquittal in the face of equally plausible oppos-
ing inferences can at least ground their holdings in the higher burden of proof 
and other due process concerns that arguably compete with the right of a jury 
in criminal cases—especially because the “accused,” not the prosecution, en-
joys the right to a jury trial.159 Civil cases, by contrast, present less compelling 
competing considerations but have nevertheless engendered doctrinal confu-
sion about the jury’s power to choose between ostensibly equal inferences. In 
1976, the First Circuit noted in Carlson v. American Safety Equipment Corp. 
that courts take two different approaches when two inferences are equally 
plausible.160 Under one view, “a jury is entitled to make a reasonable inference 
from the evidence even if ‘some other inference equally reasonable might be 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Id. at 112. 
 155 Id. at 113. 
 156 E.g., United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 755 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lovern, 590 
F.3d 1095, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009); O’Laughlin v. O’Brien, 568 F.3d 287, 301 (1st Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Elashyi, 554 F.3d 480, 492 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hawkins, 547 F.3d 66, 81 (2d Cir. 
2008); United States v. Caseer, 399 F.3d 828, 840 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 157 Cf. Johnson, 592 F.3d at 755 (illustrating a judge’s determination about how a jury must per-
ceive the evidence based on his own assessment that “the plausibility of each inference is about the 
same”). 
 158 Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139–40 (1954); see United States v. Hernandez, 440 F. 
App’x 159, 161 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cervantes, 646 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 159 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”). 
 160 528 F.2d 384, 386 (1st Cir. 1976). 
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drawn therefrom.’”161 Under the other view, if “two equally possible inferences 
exist, a jury cannot employ . . . guesswork, speculation, or conjecture to decide 
a case”162—a position that flatly contradicts the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Lavender.163 
A 2001 Texas case illustrates this confusion. In Lozano v. Lozano, the 
Texas Supreme Court examined the equal-inference rule in reviewing a multi-
million-dollar verdict against the parents and three siblings of a man who ab-
ducted his infant daughter to the detriment of the mother’s custody rights.164 
The central question was whether each respective family member intended to 
assist in the abduction.165 The justices differed significantly in their assess-
ments of the evidence against each defendant and wrote four opinions to cap-
ture their differing permutations.166 A key dispute was whether the equal-
inference rule precluded a finding of liability. One opinion limited the rule’s 
significance, reasoning that circumstantial evidence can be sufficient despite 
multiple reasonable inferences.167 But another opinion insisted that a jury 
could not simply choose between equally likely inferences when evaluating 
circumstantial evidence.168 
It is here that the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Twombly enters into 
the analysis because Twombly effectively sounded the death knell for plaintiffs 
in federal equal-inference cases. In Twombly, the Court rejected the plausibility 
of the plaintiffs’ antitrust-conspiracy claim because the underlying factual de-
                                                                                                                           
 161 Galvin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 488 F.3d 1026, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Arterburn v. St. Jo-
seph Hosp. & Rehabilitation Ctr., 551 P.2d 886, 890 (Kan. 1976)); see also Daniels v. Twin Oaks 
Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[A] verdict based on circumstantial evidence 
is not infirm simply because the evidence supports an equally probable inference to the contrary.”); 
Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061, 1067 (4th Cir. 1969) (“Termination of the case 
by the court upon its appraisal of the two conflicting inferences as equally probable was a violation, 
we think, of the federal standard and the province of the jury . . . .”); Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. 
Myrick, 304 F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that it was improper to take the case from the jury 
even where “inconsistent and uncertain inferences are equally supported by the proof”). 
 162 Morris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 330 F.3d 854, 865 (6th Cir. 2003) (Krupansky, J., dissenting); 
see also Se. Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767, 777 (6th Cir. 1970) (“When there are 
equal inferences which can be drawn from a particular set of facts—one inference indicating liability, 
the other non-liability—it is the judge’s obligation at the direct verdict stage of the trial to find for the 
defendant.”). 
 163 See Lavender, 327 U.S. at 652; supra notes 140–146 and accompanying text. 
 164 52 S.W.3d at 149 (Phillips, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 165 See id. at 144 (per curiam). 
 166 See id. at 143–44; id. at 144–56 (Phillips, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 
156–65 (Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 165–69 (Baker, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 167 Id. at 148 (Phillips, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that “circum-
stantial evidence is not legally insufficient merely because more than one reasonable inference may be 
drawn from it”). 
 168 Id. at 158 (Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that when “circumstan-
tial evidence supports two reasonable inferences, neither of which is any more likely than the other,” a 
jury may not “pick one”). 
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tail alleged only “parallel conduct,” which was inadequate to warrant an infer-
ence of the required conspiracy.169 The Court repeatedly suggested that an in-
ference of liability is not sustainable unless it is more likely than an inference 
of nonliability. For example, the Court explained that parallel conduct, though 
“consistent with conspiracy,” was “just as much in line with” legal market be-
havior.170 It later reiterated that “merely parallel conduct . . . could just as well 
be independent action.”171 To be sure, the Court refuted the suggestion that its 
holding imposed “a probability requirement at the pleading stage.”172 But if 
“just as much” or “just as well” are not probable enough to survive dismissal, 
then by definition something more than an equal inference is required.173 At 
bottom, then, the requirement that plaintiffs “nudge[] their claims across the 
line from conceivable to plausible”174 spells doom for a plaintiff who can al-
lege only those facts that are “just as” consistent with nonliability as with lia-
bility.175 As one dissenting judge in the Seventh Circuit has suggested, it is too 
easy under Twombly to hold simply that “a tie goes to the defendant.”176 
Perhaps the most insidious aspect of the equal-inference rule is the prem-
ise that one can measure so precisely the likelihood or reasonableness of two 
competing inferences. Doing so is necessarily a subjective exercise that risks 
usurping jury’s power,177 as some courts have implicitly recognized.178 In some 
respects, it is worse than the rule against implausible inferences because the 
                                                                                                                           
 169 550 U.S. at 556–57. 
 170 Id. at 554 (emphasis added). 
 171 Id. at 557 (emphasis added). 
 172 See id. at 556. 
 173 Twombly’s disingenuous rejection of equal inferences while maintaining the absence of a 
probability requirement has begun to infect lower courts’ analyses. See, e.g., Burtch v. Milberg Fac-
tors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 228 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Based on Twombly, we disagree . . . that the . . . District 
Court applied a probability, rather than a plausibility, standard.”). 
 174 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 175 See id.; Pardo, supra note 105, at 1483 (advocating for dismissal where there is “an alternative 
explanation of the events that a reasonable jury must find at least as plausible and that would not 
entitle the plaintiff to relief” (emphasis added)). 
 176 See McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 626 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
 177 See Dorsaneo, supra note 29, at 1710–11 (“In the hands of a reviewing judge who wants to 
violate the jury’s province so as to impose his or her own idiosyncratic preferences on the case, the 
‘equal inferences rule’ provides an ideal tool.”). 
 178 E.g., Arms v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 731 F.2d 1245, 1250 (6th Cir. 1984) (“If reasonable 
minds could differ over the question of whether the probabilities of the conflicting inferences are 
equally balanced, then a jury question is presented.”); Moore v. Car. Power & Light Co., 537 F.2d 
1252, 1254 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that a court should accept a jury verdict where “the jury could 
reasonably draw the inferences necessary to the plaintiff’s case or could reasonably find the plaintiff’s 
and defendants’ inferences equally likely”); Yeager v. J.R. Christ Co., 364 F.2d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1966) 
(noting that “it is beyond the power of the court” to decide whether reasonable inferences are in equi-
poise (quoting Smith v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 153 A.2d 477, 480 (Pa. 1959) (internal quotation marks 
omitted))). 
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judgment calls are inevitably closer—as the divided Texas Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lozano illustrates.179 
C. The Problem of Antithesis Inferences 
Judges frequently instruct juries that they may disbelieve a witness and 
thereby reject all or part of the witness’s testimony.180 This well-accepted 
premise, however, raises a more controversial question: whether a jury may go 
a step further and infer, from a belief that the witness’s testimony is not true, 
that the truth is the opposite—or what one might call the “antithesis infer-
ence.”181 There is intuitive logic in permitting jurors to conclude that a prevari-
cating witness is concealing the very wrongdoing at issue in the case, especial-
ly if the witness is the party accused of wrongdoing or is closely aligned with 
that party. The inference that the wrongdoer has a motive to deny wrongdoing 
“‘is one of the simplest in human experience.’”182 Sometimes, then, a jury may 
conclude that a given fact is less likely merely because a witness lacking cred-
ibility testified to that fact.183 
As far back as 1899, in Sonnentheil v. Christian Moerlein Brewing Co., 
the Supreme Court recognized the possibility that “[e]ven negative evidence 
may sometimes have a positive value.”184 But courts, including the Supreme 
Court, have generally been hostile to accepting the probative value of the an-
tithesis inference, especially without other evidence in support of the party car-
rying the burden of proof. For example, in 1891, the Court in Bunt v. Sierra 
Butte Gold Mining Co. held that a plaintiff could not meet his burden of proof 
by calling the defendant’s employees as witnesses in the hope that the jury 
would disbelieve them.185 Over the years, numerous cases have similarly re-
                                                                                                                           
 179 See supra notes 166–169 and accompanying text. 
 180 See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 512 (1984) (“When the 
testimony of a witness is not believed, the trier of fact may simply disregard it.”); Moore v. Chesa-
peake & Ohio Ry., 340 U.S. 573, 576 (1951); Alberts v. HCA, Inc., 496 B.R. 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(observing that the precept that factfinders can choose to reject some or all of an expert witness’s 
testimony is a “fundamental principle”). 
 181 See, e.g., Schnapper, supra note 3, at 267 (reasoning that a jury can conclude that a witness is 
deliberately offering testimony that is the opposite of the truth based on the witness’s demeanor). 
 182 Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1069 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) 
(quoting 2 WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 278(2), at 133). 
 183 Richard D. Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility and Hearsay, 96 YALE L.J. 667, 734 
(1987). 
 184 172 U.S. 401, 410 (1899). 
 185 138 U.S. 483, 485 (1891). The Bunt Court held that “disbelief” of the defendant’s employees’ 
testimony “could not supply a want of proof.” Id. The phrase “want of proof” is confusing because it 
suggests that disbelief would not be fatal to the plaintiff’s case. But the Court upheld a directed verdict 
for the defendant, so in this context, the phrase “a want of proof” apparently means adequate proof. 
See id.; see also Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Guarantee Reserve Life Ins. Co. of Hammond, 365 F.2d 
28, 34 (7th Cir. 1966) (“The disbelief of Seidel’s testimony cannot support an affirmative finding that 
the reverse of his testimony is true, that is, it cannot supply a want of proof.”). 
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jected the antithesis inference as an adequate basis for submitting a case to the 
jury.186 The First Circuit explained that the danger of permitting the antithesis 
inference was “obvious,” as it would allow a plaintiff to prove its case solely 
through impeachment.187 
Still, the antithesis inference found support among some jurists and com-
mentators—notably Judge Jerome Frank—until the Supreme Court squarely 
rejected it in 1986.188 Despite its general rejection, a modified form of the an-
tithesis inference has enjoyed a normative acceptance in employment-
discrimination and criminal cases, although not as a means of overcoming a 
plaintiff’s initial burden of proof.189 It has also been applied, albeit obliquely, 
in assessing the propriety of punitive-damage awards.190 Finally, it has close 
ties to adverse inferences that can apply when a party chooses to withhold evi-
dence.191 I discuss each of these areas in turn. 
1. The Antithesis Inference from Judge Frank to Liberty Lobby 
Perhaps the greatest judicial champion of the antithesis inference was 
Judge Jerome Frank. Judge Frank is remembered as one of the central propo-
nents of the Legal Realism movement.192 He argued that “trial-court fact-
finding is the toughest part of the judicial function” and is one area where “re-
form is most needed.”193 Not surprisingly, then, he placed great probative val-
                                                                                                                           
 186 E.g., Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 512 (“Normally the discredited testimony is not considered a 
sufficient basis for drawing a contrary conclusion.”); Moore, 340 U.S. at 576 (“Nor would the possi-
bility alone that the jury might disbelieve the engineer’s version make the case submissible to it.”); In 
re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A plaintiff cannot 
make his case just by asking the jury to disbelieve the defendant’s witnesses . . . .”); Branion v. Gram-
ly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1263 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Disbelief is not evidence of the opposite of the thing discred-
ited . . . .”); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784 (1st Cir. 1965) (“[D]isbelief of testimony does not of 
itself constitute a basis for finding the opposite.”); Magidson v. Duggan, 212 F.2d 748, 759 (8th Cir. 
1954) (“[T]he giving of such false testimony is substantive proof of nothing.”); Dyer v. MacDougall, 
201 F.2d 265, 268–69 (2d Cir. 1952) (rejecting the use of the antithesis inference because of the poten-
tial lack of a meaningful appeal that would result from a trial transcript that would not reflect demean-
or); see also Imwinkelried, supra note 47, at 194 (noting the “wealth of case law embracing the view” 
that demeanor is not substantive evidence); Wellborn, supra note 76, at 1101 & n.127 (noting that 
“[h]undreds of cases” reject the antithesis inference). 
 187 Janigan, 344 F.2d at 784–85 (noting that a plaintiff could prove “any proposition in the world 
by the simple process of calling one’s adversary and arguing to the jury that he was not to be be-
lieved”). 
 188 See infra notes 192–222 and accompanying text. 
 189 See infra notes 223–243 and accompanying text. 
 190 See infra notes 244–252 and accompanying text. 
 191 See infra notes 253–261 and accompanying text. 
 192 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749, 749–50 n.2 
(2013). Judge Frank sat on the Second Circuit from 1941 until his death in 1957. Stewart E. Sterk, The 
Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 995 n.226 (1994). 
 193 JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 4 (1949). 
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ue on demeanor evidence194 and was perhaps one of the most vocal critics of 
the summary-judgment procedure’s reliance on paper evidence.195 For exam-
ple, in one 1950 case, he lamented “one more regrettable instance of an effort 
to save time by an improper reversion to ‘trial by affidavit’” despite the in-
volvement of a factual issue that turned on credibility.196 
In Arnstein, Judge Frank not only authorized a jury to accept the plain-
tiff’s arguably implausible inferences,197 but also held that a jury disbelieving 
the defendant’s testimony (e.g., that the defendant was unfamiliar with the 
plaintiff’s musical works) could “reasonably infer” the opposite.198 His opinion 
emphasized that “where, as here, credibility, including that of the defendant, is 
crucial, summary judgment becomes improper and a trial indispensable.”199 
And in the 1952 Second Circuit case Dyer v. MacDougall, Judge Frank wrote a 
concurring opinion suggesting that factfinders should be able to find that a 
plaintiff has met its burden of proof based solely on an antithesis inference 
arising from a witness’s demeanor evidence.200 
Judge Learned Hand, who authored the majority opinion in Dyer, also 
recognized the logic behind the antithesis inference. Judge Hand wrote that if a 
defendant had a motive to lie, a factfinder might well believe from demeanor 
evidence that he “is fabricating, and that, if he is, there is no alternative but to 
assume the truth of what he denies,” leading to “a possibly rational verdict” for 
the plaintiff.201 Nevertheless, he rejected the availability of the antithesis infer-
ence on procedural grounds.202 He concluded that there could be no meaning-
ful appeal from a verdict in such a case if the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s case 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 487–90 (2d Cir. 1952) (noting that demeanor 
assessments, although subjective, are extremely helpful in evaluating evidence). 
 195 See, e.g., Bauman, supra note 48, at 488 (“Judge Frank’s . . . belief in the importance of de-
meanor evidence in judging the credibility of testimonial evidence has led him to [reject summary 
judgment] in almost all cases where proof supporting the motion is other than an unimpeached docu-
ment.”); Sonenshein, supra note 48, at 779 (“Judge Jerome Frank . . . apparently believed that sum-
mary judgment is only appropriate in cases that turn on documentary evidence  . . . .”). 
 196 Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 872–73 (2d Cir. 1949). Judge Frank’s colleague on the Second 
Circuit, Judge Charles E. Clark, took the opposite view. Charles E. Clark, Special Problems in Draft-
ing and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493, 503–05 (1950). He criticized 
narrow constructions of the summary-judgment standard, particularly the approach that required a trial 
“where there is ‘the slightest doubt’ as to the facts.” Id. at 504. Judge Clark believed that under such a 
standard, there could “hardly be a summary judgment ever, for at least a slight doubt can be developed 
as to practically all things human.” Id. 
 197 See 154 F.2d at 469–71; supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text (describing the plaintiff’s 
allegations of espionage by “stooges”). 
 198 154 F.2d at 469. 
 199 Id. at 471. 
 200 201 F.2d at 270 (Frank, J., concurring) (reasoning that factfinders “should be allowed to find 
that a plaintiff has discharged his burden of proof when [they] disbelieve[] oral testimony . . . adverse 
to plaintiff,” even when “there is no evidence for [the] plaintiff except that ‘demeanor evidence’”). 
 201 Id. at 269 (majority opinion). 
 202 Id. 
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depended on the adverse inference because the trial transcript would not reflect 
demeanor.203 But Judge Hand wrote so favorably about the logic of the antithe-
sis inference that at least one commentator has felt the need to clarify that he 
actually rejected it.204 And in 1962, in NLRB v. Walton Manufacturing Co., the 
Supreme Court quoted the majority opinion in Dyer as support for an agency 
examiner’s factual finding,205 prompting Justice Felix Frankfurter to explain in 
a dissenting opinion that Judge Hand’s statement supporting the inference 
“was one of logic, not of law.”206 
Other commentators have since joined in debating the wisdom of Judge 
Frank’s view. A few years after Dyer, for example, one scholar suggested that 
Judge Frank’s opinion was unprincipled,207 which suggests a concern based 
less on the procedural problem of appellate review than on the difficulty in 
ever determining that a plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient.208 More recently, 
one commentator embraced Judge Frank’s approach for certain cases, particu-
larly where the proposition in question is likely to be true apart from the an-
tithesis inference—such as when the fact to be established through the antithe-
sis inference is otherwise plausible, or when there is other evidence corrobo-
rates that fact.209 Another scholar similarly endorsed resort to the antithesis 
inference when there is evidence to support not only the conclusion that the 
witness’s testimony was untrue, but also that the witness was being deliberate-
ly dishonest.210 And one commentator, a critic of the value of demeanor evi-
dence,211 subscribes to the antithesis inference if a witness’s testimony can rea-
sonably be deemed false without relying on demeanor evidence.212 
In 1962, nine years after Dyer, a divided Supreme Court in Poller v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, Inc. flirted with the antithesis inference in the 
                                                                                                                           
 203 Id. 
 204 See Imwinkelried, supra note 47, at 193. 
 205 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). 
 206 Id. at 418 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 207 Bauman, supra note 48, at 526 (noting that “Judge Frank . . . fails to cite cases which permit a 
plaintiff to win without presenting affirmative evidence proving the material facts of the claim” and 
that “[i]t is exceedingly doubtful if any such cases can be found”). 
 208 This reasoning is reminiscent of the First Circuit’s critique of the antithesis inference. See 
Janigan, 344 F.2d at 784–85 (reasoning that the antithesis inference would allow a plaintiff to create 
substantive evidence by impeaching witnesses). 
 209 Friedman supra note 183, at 735 n.134; see also Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, 
Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2011) (Korman, J., dissenting). As discussed above, this char-
acterization creates more problems than it solves. See supra notes 82–134 and accompanying text. 
 210 Schnapper, supra note 3, at 268; accord NLRB v. Joseph Antell, Inc., 358 F.2d 880, 883 (1st 
Cir. 1966) (“Affirmative proof . . . that the reason given was false warrants the inference that some 
other reason was being concealed.” (citation omitted)). See generally Dorsaneo, supra note 29, at 
1705 (suggesting that “uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony of a disinterested fact witnesses” 
alone does not permit the antithesis inference). 
 211 See Wellborn, supra note 76, at 1075. 
 212 Id. at 1103. 
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antitrust context, noting that “where motive and intent play leading roles, the 
proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses 
thicken the plot.”213 But in the last fifty years, courts have almost uniformly 
rejected the antithesis inference.214 For instance, in the Supreme Court’s 1968 
decision in First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., the Court de-
cided a summary-judgment case against another antitrust plaintiff based on the 
Court’s own conclusion that the defendant’s lawful explanation for its conduct 
was “much more plausible” than the plaintiff’s theory of liability.215 In this 
case, the Court made no mention of the possibility that a jury might draw the 
opposite conclusion based upon the demeanor of the defendant’s witnesses at 
trial.216 Indeed, the Court upheld summary judgment for the defendant even 
though the plaintiff was unable to question several pivotal witnesses.217 
The Supreme Court drove the nail into the coffin of the antithesis infer-
ence in its 1986 decision in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.218 There, the Court 
held that a plaintiff opposing summary judgment could not “defeat a defend-
ant’s properly supported motion . . . by merely asserting that the jury might, 
and legally could, disbelieve the defendant’s denial . . . .”219 In short, the Court 
held that the antithesis inference has no role to play in summary-judgment de-
cisions. Similarly, Justice Antonin Scalia recently expressed skepticism that the 
evidence at trial will be more helpful to a plaintiff than the evidence in the 
summary-judgment record.220 The upshot is that a defendant who lies under 
oath in an affidavit can avoid subjecting himself to the rigors of cross-
examination at trial if the plaintiff does not have access to other proof.221 That 
                                                                                                                           
 213 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). 
 214 See supra note 186 (collecting cases). 
 215 391 U.S. 253, 285 (1968). 
 216 See id. at 284–88. 
 217 Id. at 303 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that plaintiff “never had an opportunity to question 
four of the eight [defense witnesses] who had been most intimately connected with the alleged trans-
actions”). 
 218 See 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). 
 219 Id. Likewise, the lower courts have continued to reject the antithesis inference. See, e.g., 
Spacecon Specialty Contractors, LLC v. Bensinger, 713 F.3d 1028, 1049 n.14 (10th Cir. 2013) (rea-
soning that the court could not reverse summary judgment “on the presumption the jury could simply 
choose not to believe [the defendant’s] evidence”); LaFrenier v. Kinirey, 550 F.3d 166, 167 (1st Cir. 
2008) (“The appeal sounds a single key theme: that summary judgment could not be granted because 
LaFrenier is entitled to attack the credibility of the officers’ testimony. As a matter of law this is incor-
rect.”); Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 143 F.3d 120, 130 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that “con-
cerns regarding the credibility of witnesses cannot defeat summary judgment”). 
 220 Transcript of Oral Argument at 56, Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884 (2011) (No. 09-737), avail-
able at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-737.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/C3KK-JXUY (“That’s not going to happen very often.”). 
 221 There are nevertheless a few courts, including the Tenth Circuit, that continue to hold “that 
‘summary judgment should not be based on the deposition or affidavit of an interested party . . . as to 
facts known only to him—a situation where demeanor evidence might serve as real evidence to per-
suade a trier of fact to reject his testimony.’” Wood v. Handy & Harman Co., 318 F. App’x 602, 606 
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result is especially troublesome in state-of-mind cases, where veracity is criti-
cal but untested by the cold record of an affidavit or even a deposition tran-
script.222 
2. The Antithesis Inference in Employment-Discrimination and Criminal 
Cases 
Despite the general judicial hostility to the antithesis inference, two cate-
gories of cases have embraced a limited form of it: employment-discrimination 
cases under statutes like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age 
Discrimination and Employment Act, as well as criminal cases.223 In both are-
as, courts have held that juries are sometimes free to infer, from the conclusion 
that a witness is lying, that the truth is the opposite of the lie. 
The Supreme Court recognizes that circumstantial evidence is critical in 
employment-discrimination cases because “[t]here will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ 
testimony as to the employer’s mental processes.”224 Thus, the framework for 
proving employment discrimination through circumstantial evidence requires 
plaintiffs initially to establish only that they belong to a protected class (e.g., 
race, gender, national origin, or age), were qualified for their position, and suf-
fered an adverse employment action that someone outside the protected class 
did not suffer.225 The burden then shifts to the employer to offer a nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the employment action.226 At that point, the factfinder must 
decide whether the employer’s proffered reason was pretextual and, if it was, 
whether discrimination actually provoked the action.227 
                                                                                                                           
(10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Madison v. Deseret Livestock Co., 574 F.2d 1027, 1037 (10th Cir. 1978)). 
But most courts hold that a challenge to interested-party testimony is not enough to defeat summary 
judgment. See, e.g., Coe v. N. Pipe Prods., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1075 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (hold-
ing that where the nonmovant “merely asserted that the witnesses are ‘interested,’ [the] court . . . may 
consider the ‘interested’ witnesses’ factual assertions in its disposition of the summary judgment mo-
tion”); 377 Realty Partners, L.P. v. Taffarello, 561 F. Supp. 2d 659, 662 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (reasoning 
that “summary judgment may be granted based upon the affidavits of interested parties” if the affida-
vits are clear and consistent); Martinez v. Prestige Ford Garland Ltd. P’ship, No. Civ.A.3:03-CV-251-
L, 2004 WL 1194460, at *4 n.7 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2004) (“The court knows of no rule which re-
quires exclusion of an affidavit because the affiant is an interested party.”). 
 222 Cf. Bauman, supra note 48, at 490 (“[T]here appears to be no reason for giving to a party 
moving for summary judgment an advantage he would not enjoy at a trial . . . .”). 
 223 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012) (age discrimination); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (employ-
ment discrimination); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (discrim-
ination context); Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992) (plurality opinion) (criminal context). 
 224 U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983). 
 225 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (articulating the threshold crite-
ria for Title VII claims). The Court has not squarely addressed the application of the McDonnell 
Douglas framework to cases involving age discrimination but has instead assumed that it applies. 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). 
 226 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–03. 
 227 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). 
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The finding that the employer’s reason was pretextual does not automati-
cally require the factfinder to find for the plaintiff. For example, in the 1993 
U.S. Supreme Court case St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, the Court distin-
guished between a subsequent finding of “unlawful discrimination” and “the 
much different (and much lesser) finding that the employer’s explanation of its 
action was not believable.”228 Nevertheless, in 2000, the Court suggested in 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. that, at least in some cases, a 
factfinder may use a finding of pretext to conclude that the employer engaged 
in unlawful discrimination: “In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can 
reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dis-
sembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.”229 The Court couched its hold-
ing within “the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled 
to consider a party’s dishonesty about a material fact as ‘affirmative evidence 
of guilt.’”230 
It is rather astonishing that the Court characterized the antithesis inference 
as a “general principle of evidence law” when the vast majority of courts (in-
cluding the Supreme Court itself) have rejected it.231 Other than in employ-
                                                                                                                           
 228 Id. Under Hicks, even when the jury disbelieves the employer, the antithesis inference “is not 
required and may not even be the only reasonable conclusion.” Pardo, supra note 105, at 1506; see 
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515. At least one commentator disputes the soundness of the Court’s reasoning, 
however. Leland Ware, Inferring Intent from Proof of Pretext: Resolving the Summary Judgment Con-
fusion in Employment Discrimination Cases Alleging Disparate Treatment, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y 
J. 37, 58–59 (2000) (“If the employer lies about the reason for the plaintiff’s discharge, it is more 
likely than not that the actual reason is one that is adverse to its interests.”). 
 229 530 U.S. at 147. 
 230 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Wright, 505 U.S. at 296 (plurality opinion)). Despite the sweep-
ing language in Reeves, demeanor may not be an adequate basis for demonstrating pretext, as most 
courts require the plaintiff to adduce additional evidence to call the employer’s credibility into legiti-
mate question. See, e.g., White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 393 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting 
that pretext can be demonstrated if the employer’s proffered reasons: (1) are not factually supported, 
(2) are not the actual reasons for an action, (3) are insufficient to explain the employer’s action, or (4) 
would have been an unreasonable action for the employer to take); Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 
349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003). Reeves also cautioned, obliquely, that a finding of pretext would not 
be sufficient to allow a case to reach a jury when there is conclusive evidence of “some other, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employer’s decision” or a weak allegation of pretext coupled with “abun-
dant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.” 530 U.S. at 148. 
Nevertheless, once the plaintiff has adduced evidence suggesting pretext, most courts allow cases to 
go to the jury. See, e.g., Carter v. Toyota Tsusho Am., Inc., 529 F. App’x 601, 608–10 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that a fact question as to pretext, without additional evidence of discrimination, will always 
be sufficient to survive summary judgment); Black v. Pan Am. Labs., L.L.C., 646 F.3d 254, 276 n.11 
(5th Cir. 2011) (noting that pretext alone is insufficient only in “rare” cases (quoting Russell v. 
McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 223 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also Burgess v. Bowen, 466 F. App’x 272, 277 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that pretext alone is insufficient 
only in “unique situations”). 
 231 See supra note 186 (collecting cases). This statement takes on further significance given the 
Supreme Court’s recognition that “trial courts should not treat discrimination differently from other 
ultimate questions of fact.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 524) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
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ment discrimination cases, the antithesis inference has gained traction only in 
criminal cases. So it perhaps is not surprising that the Reeves Court’s concluso-
ry acceptance of the antithesis inference relies on a 1992 Supreme Court crim-
inal case, Wright v. West.232 
In Wright, a plurality of the Court, citing Judge Hand’s opinion in Dy-
er,233 held that a jury was free “to consider whatever it concluded to be per-
jured testimony as affirmative evidence of guilt.”234 Although the antithesis 
inference did not garner the support of a majority of justices in Wright, several 
circuit courts have come to embrace it in criminal cases. The value of the an-
tithesis inference is particularly well established in the Eleventh Circuit, where 
a defendant’s statement may be regarded as substantive evidence of guilt if the 
jury doubts its veracity.235 A similar rule obtains in the First and Ninth Cir-
cuits236 and has been supported by at least one commentator,237 whereas the 
Sixth and D.C. Circuits have taken a contrary view.238 The D.C. Circuit has 
criticized the derogation of a testifying defendant’s appellate rights that results 
from use of the antithesis inference.239 In those cases, the appellate court 
would be required to presume that the jury based the conviction on its disbelief 
                                                                                                                           
 232 See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 134 (“In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably 
infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory 
purpose.” (citing Wright, 505 U.S. at 296)). 
 233 Wright, 505 U.S. at 296 (citing Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 620–21 (1896); United 
States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 506 U.S. 534 (1993); Dyer, 201 F.2d at 269). 
The Wright Court’s reliance on Judge Hand’s opinion in Dyer is curious in light of Judge Hand’s ulti-
mate rejection of the antithesis inference. See Dyer, 201 F.2d at 269; supra notes 201–207 and accom-
panying text (discussing Dyer). 
 234 Wright, 505 U.S. at 296 (plurality opinion). 
 235 United States v. Williams, 390 F.3d 1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A] statement by a defend-
ant, if disbelieved by the jury, may be considered as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” 
(quoting United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted))). Thus, defendants who choose to testify expose themselves to great risk. Id. 
 236 United States v. Cordova Barajas, 360 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The jury was free to 
disbelieve Mr. Barajas and infer the opposite of his testimony to support its verdict.”); United States v. 
Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 989 (1st Cir. 1987) (“The jury was reasonably entitled to disbelieve Cintolo’s 
testimony regarding his motives and to credit the (entirely plausible) contrary interpretation urged by 
the government.”). 
 237 Minzner, supra note 76, at 2559 (“Once the jury concludes a defendant has committed perjury, 
they are entitled to take that as affirmative evidence of guilt.”). 
 238 United States v. El Sayed, 470 F. App’x 491, 493–94 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that the antithesis 
inference cannot remedy otherwise insufficient evidence, despite the high deference given to a jury’s 
credibility determinations); United States v. Bailey, 553 F.3d 940, 946–47 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
the prosecution has the burden of producing affirmative evidence as to the elements of the charged 
crime “[r]egardless of whether the jury believed [the defendants’] oral testimony”); United States v. 
Ziegler, 994 F.2d 845, 849–50 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 239 See Ziegler, 994 F.2d at 849. The Ziegler court observed that unlike other types of evidence, 
“[d]emeanor evidence is not captured by the transcript; when the witness steps down, it is gone forev-
er.” Id. Thus, the Ziegler court felt that it was unable to “determine whether [the defendant], by her 
demeanor on the stand, supplied the evidence needed to support her conviction.” Id. at 850. 
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of the defendant’s testimony, so “the evidence invariably would be sufficient to 
sustain the conviction.”240 
Even when courts in employment-discrimination and criminal cases permit 
the antithesis inference, they impose an important limitation: the plaintiff or 
prosecutor must still meet the initial burden of proof without the inference. In 
employment cases, the employer has no burden to adduce evidence of a nondis-
criminatory motive—and, thus, a finding of pretext can never arise—unless and 
until the plaintiff presents a prima facie case.241 In criminal cases, a defendant 
who chooses to testify does not do so until after the prosecution has rested its 
case,242 meaning the prosecution has presumably adduced sufficient evidence 
without the defendant’s testimony.243 Still, discrimination and criminal cases are 
anomalous in their inclusion of the antithesis inference in the overall landscape 
of what a factfinder may permissibly consider in adjudicating liability. 
3. The Antithesis Inference in Evaluating the Propriety of Punitive 
Damages 
Although the law is scant, there has been some suggestion that the antith-
esis inference may have a role to play in evaluating the propriety of punitive-
damages awards. For example, in 1996, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. 
Gore, the Supreme Court held that due process requires lower courts to review 
punitive damage awards for excessiveness and established “the degree of rep-
rehensibility of the defendant’s conduct” as “[p]erhaps the most important in-
dicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award.”244 Importantly, 
this reprehensibility finding, in turn, hinges largely on the witnesses’ credibil-
ity.245 Indeed, in the Court’s 2001 case Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman 
Tool Group, Inc.—though holding that an appellate court generally owes no 
deference to the district court’s excessiveness review246—the Court noted that 
district courts do have a superior vantage point for conclusions premised on 
“witness credibility and demeanor.”247 In that vein, the Ninth Circuit has sug-
gested that a defendant’s persistent dishonesty during trial—especially his de-
                                                                                                                           
 240 Id. at 849. 
 241 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–03. 
 242 See Zafiro, 945 F.2d at 888 (“The government cannot force a defendant to take the stand . . . .”). 
 243 See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a) (permitting defendant to move for judgment of acquittal 
based on insufficient evidence). 
 244 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996); see also State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 
419 (2003) (discussing Gore). 
 245 Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 272 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(noting that the reprehensibility determination “depends in meaningful part upon the credibility of 
witnesses”), vacated, 538 U.S. 974, reinstated as modified, 345 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 246 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (“[T]he de novo standard should govern [the appellate court’s] deci-
sion.”). 
 247 Id. at 440. 
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ceitful testimony—justified an inference that the defendant attempted to con-
ceal his wrongful conduct, which consequently supported a punitive-damages 
award.248 Similarly, in a fraud case, the Federal Circuit found the requisite lev-
el of reprehensibility based in part on the trial court’s determination that sever-
al defense witnesses had lied in court.249 
These decisions fit squarely within the doctrine articulated by many 
courts that a defendant’s efforts to conceal wrongful conduct can warrant an 
inference that the defendant had the requisite nefarious state of mind for puni-
tive damages.250 There is attractive logic to extending this doctrine to circum-
stances in which a witness lies at trial because testimonial lies are consistent 
with an overall plan of concealment. But it also takes the antithesis inference 
one step further than its other applications; where punitive damages are in-
volved, the available inference is not only that the truth is the opposite of the 
witness’s testimony, but that the purpose of the false testimony was a mali-
cious intent to cover up the misconduct. Perhaps for that reason, some courts—
before permitting a jury to consider punitive damages based on concealment—
insist on a specific showing that the defendant intended to cover up the wrong-
doing at the time of the wrongdoing, and not simply after the fact.251 
                                                                                                                           
 248 S. Union Co. v. Sw. Gas Corp., 415 F.3d 1001, 1010 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing the defendant’s 
“persever[ance] in hiding his wrongful acts throughout the trial and in particular while testifying in 
Court before the jury” (quoting S. Union Co. v. Sw. Gas Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1096 (D. Ariz. 
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted))). The Ninth Circuit nevertheless vacated the punitive-
damages award as excessive. See id. at 1011. 
 249 Rhone-Poulenc, 272 F.3d at 1349 (remarking that the defense witnesses made “several rather 
implausible explanations and assertions”). Commentators have argued that the Federal Circuit based 
its reprehensibility finding in Rhone-Poulenc “almost entirely on perceived witness credibility.” Gale 
R. Peterson & Derrick A. Pizarro, Recent Developments in Patent Law: Decisions by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 497, 555 (2004). 
 250 See, e.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 551 (1999) (holding that an employer 
that “conceal[s] evidence regarding its ‘true’ selection procedures” can, on that basis, be held liable 
for willful violation of law necessary to an award of punitive damages); Motorola Credit Corp. v. 
Uzan, 509 F.3d 74, 86 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding a punitive-damages award where the defendants 
“sought to advance and conceal their scheme through an almost endless series of lies, threats, and 
chicanery” (quoting Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 481, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 388 F.3d 39, 65 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Romano v. 
U-Haul Int’l, 233 F.3d 655, 673 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding requisite reprehensibility where the employer 
“knowingly violated [the employee’s] federally protected rights and then attempted to conceal this 
violation”); Sec. Title Agency, Inc. v. Pope, 200 P.3d 977, 999 n.22 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (“In deter-
mining whether a defendant’s conduct was reprehensible for the purpose of deciding if an award is 
constitutionally excessive . . . [,] we may consider a defendant’s attempt to conceal its wrongdoing.”); 
Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 344 (Ohio 1994) (“An intentional alteration, falsi-
fication or destruction of medical records by a doctor, to avoid liability for his or her medical negli-
gence, is sufficient to show actual malice, and punitive damages may be awarded . . . .”). 
 251 E.g., Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 408 F. App’x 162, 169–70 (10th Cir. 
2011) (noting that the defendant’s “attempt . . . to cover his tracks” was only “after he had initiated his 
recruiting scheme, and the jury had no reason to infer otherwise”); Juarez v. ACS Gov’t Solutions 
Group, Inc., 314 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that the defendant’s “cover-up after the fact 
does not necessarily import previous evil intent”); cf. Leavey v. UNUM/Provident Corp., No. CV-02-
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4. The Antithesis Inference as a Logical Extension of the Adverse Inference 
Finally, one might consider the antithesis inference a cousin to the well-
established rule that a factfinder may draw an adverse inference from eviden-
tiary lapses that result from culpable conduct.252 The adverse inference applies, 
for example, “where evidence has been altered or destroyed.”253 In cases of 
spoliation, if the party responsible for the destruction had a “culpable state of 
mind,”254 the judge may instruct the jury that “the party that has prevented 
production did so out of the well-founded fear that the contents would harm 
him.”255 The jury is then free, but not required, to infer that missing evidence 
would have established facts adverse to the nonproducing party.256 A similar 
adverse inference is available in civil cases when a party chooses not to testi-
fy257 or refuses to answer questions on the basis of the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination.258 
The adverse inference, when applicable, is potentially powerful; unlike 
the antithesis inference, some courts permit the beneficiary of the adverse in-
ference to use it as an outright substitute for affirmative evidence that would 
                                                                                                                           
2281-PHX-SMM, 2006 WL 1515999, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 26, 2006) (noting that the defendants’ “liti-
gation conduct” was relevant to the punitive-damages inquiry where a “cover-up . . . occurred in tan-
dem with [the] wrongful conduct”). 
 252 See Dale A. Nance, Adverse Inferences About Adverse Inferences: Restructuring Juridical 
Roles for Responding to Evidence Tampering by Parties to Litigation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1092 
(2010) (“Courts use adverse inferences in both civil and criminal cases to respond to a variety of 
forms of evidentiary misconduct by a party . . . .”). Nance argues that courts should resort to other 
forms of discovery sanctions in order to insulate the jury from the burden of evaluating misconduct in 
the administration of the litigation. Id. at 1090–91. 
 253 Bull v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 68, 73 (3d Cir. 2012). Altering or destroying evi-
dence results in its spoliation. Id. Furthermore, parties have a duty to preserve evidence once litigation 
becomes foreseeable; failure to do so is also spoliation. Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 
1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 254 E.g., Stocker v. United States, 705 F.3d 225, 235 (6th Cir. 2013). Some courts require a show-
ing of bad faith to demonstrate a “culpable state of mind,” holding that “mere negligence in losing or 
destroying records is not sufficient to draw an adverse inference.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 
1291, 1310 (11th Cir. 2009); Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2004). Instead, 
these courts hold that an adverse inference can be drawn only where there is evidence demonstrating 
an intentional destruction of evidence that was motivated by a desire to hide information. Id. Other 
courts, however, hold that a knowing or negligent destruction of evidence can justify drawing an ad-
verse inference. E.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 113 (2d Cir. 
2002) (“[A]n adverse inference instruction . . . may be imposed upon a party that has breached a dis-
covery obligation not only through bad faith or gross negligence, but also through ordinary negligence 
. . . .”); Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that “a finding of ‘bad faith’ is 
not a prerequisite” to allowing a jury to draw an adverse inference from the destruction or spoliation 
of evidence (citation omitted)). 
 255 Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 256 Kwon v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 469 F. App’x 579, 580 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 257 Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 758–59 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 258 E.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328 (1999). 
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otherwise be required to meet the burden of proof.259 This rule is not universal; 
in fact, the traditional common law rule requires the party carrying the burden 
to meet it without relying on an adverse inference.260 Thus, the inference was 
traditionally a tool to help sway the jury, rather than a tool to establish eviden-
tiary sufficiency. But in recent years, some courts have been willing to permit 
the adverse inference to suffice, on its own, to meet an evidentiary burden.261 
It is difficult to justify a differentiation between the antithesis inference 
and the adverse inference. In both circumstances, the prevaricating party seeks 
to deceive the jury by either withholding unfavorable evidence or concealing it 
with false testimony. In both cases, then, the jury should be permitted to find 
the facts at issue in favor of the opposing party. 
III. THE HARMFUL RESULT: LOSS OF DIVERSITY, LOSS OF DEMOCRACY 
The derogation of the jury’s inference-drawing function in civil cases has 
serious consequences. In 1874, the Supreme Court explained in Sioux City & 
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Stout that “twelve [citizens] know more of the common 
affairs of life than does one” and “that they can draw wiser and safer conclu-
sions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.”262 The sheer 
size of a civil jury ensures greater diversity. Beyond the numbers, jurors histor-
ically have come “from the various classes and occupations of society,”263 in 
                                                                                                                           
 259 E.g., Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1248 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that spoliation justi-
fies a “rebuttable presumption,” sufficient to submit the case to a jury because the presumption “estab-
lishes the missing elements of the plaintiff’s case that could only have been proved by the availability 
of the missing evidence”), overruled on other grounds, Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 
2009); Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 219 (1st Cir. 1982) (af-
firming the district court’s decision to give “the act of document destruction sufficient weight to satis-
fy” the plaintiff’s burden of proof on a particular fact); Sweet v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., 895 
P.2d 484, 491 (Alaska 1995) (imposing a rebuttable presumption for the plaintiff where medical pro-
viders failed to maintain adequate records); Pub. Health Trust of Dade Cnty. v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596, 
600–01 (Fla. 1987) (same). Wigmore suggested that a party should be able to use an adverse inference 
to carry its burden of proof. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 291, at 226–28. McCormick, on the other 
hand, argued that adverse inferences resulting from an opponent’s failure to produce evidence cannot 
satisfy a litigant’s burden of proof. KENNETH S. BROUN, ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 264, at 
408 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). 
 260 Battocchi v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 581 A.2d 759, 764–65 (D.C. 1990) (rejecting the view of some 
jurisdictions that a “presumption from destruction of evidence can substitute for a lack of affirmative 
proof on an essential element of a party’s prima facie case”); Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 
633 So. 2d 1357, 1361 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (Waltzer, J., concurring); Larsen v. Romeo, 255 A.2d 387, 
391 (Md. 1969) (reasoning that an adverse inference “does not amount to substantive proof and can 
not take the place of proof of a fact necessary to the other party’s case”). 
 261 Kammerer, 633 So. 2d at 1361 & n.4 (Waltzer, J., concurring) (noting the “recent movement” 
in certain jurisdictions); see also, e.g., supra note 259 (collecting cases). 
 262 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873). 
 263 Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 222 (1862). It is nevertheless true that the Supreme Court has 
occasionally had to intervene when courts or litigants sought to exclude certain members of their 
community from jury service. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (reversing a 
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part to ensure that federal judges, “blissfully unaware” of the plight of the av-
erage person,264 would not decide cases based on their own life experiences. 
Although judges now have more diverse backgrounds than in the past, the ju-
diciary still is relatively homogenous.265 Even Justice Scalia, not known for 
championing diversity, acknowledges that Supreme Court justices are mem-
bers of an “elite class.”266 
It stands to reason that members of an elite class will draw inferences dif-
ferently from other segments of society. As Professor Louis Jaffe recognized 
over fifty years ago, evaluation of evidence depends on the unique characteris-
tics and experiences of individual factfinders.267 Thus, as the Supreme Court 
has recognized, “[f]or a jury to perform its intended function as a check on 
official power, it must be a body drawn from the community.”268 So it is no 
surprise that cases like the Court’s 2007 and 2009 decisions in Twombly and 
Iqbal cause commentators to wonder whether the justice system tilts in favor 
of those who resemble the judges—the “societal elites such as government 
officials, large corporations, or employers.”269 At the very least, the perception 
is enough to erode trust in the judicial system.270 
But flagging confidence in the system is symptomatic of larger substan-
tive concerns about the quality of the decision making. Life experiences really 
do matter. Two commentators illustrate this maxim with a compelling exam-
ple: the perceived cause of heartburn after eating a spicy meal will differ as 
                                                                                                                           
conviction after the prosecution used peremptory challenges to strike all African Americans from the 
jury); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598–99 (1935) (reversing a conviction when African Ameri-
cans were uniformly deemed unqualified for jury service). 
 264 Schnapper, supra note 3, at 281. The typical federal judge is a white man whose adult experi-
ences have been limited to college, law school, and prestigious employment. Id. 
 265 Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, and 
Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 347–48 (2012) (citing statistics on the judiciary). 
 266 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “elite” 
judiciary should defer to Colorado citizens who voted to prevent municipalities from enacting ordi-
nances to protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation). 
 267 Jaffe, supra note 149, at 1022. 
 268 Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 n.8. 
 269 Spencer, supra note 114, at 187; see also Miller, supra note 105, at 336 (“The process de-
scribed in Iqbal appeals too much to judicial subjectivity, which inevitably depends (at least in 
part) on an individual judge’s background, values, preferences, education, and attitudes . . . .”). 
 270 See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 107, at 884–85. The judicial system’s legitimacy depends on 
the citizenry’s willingness to “assent” to verdicts. Id. This assent, in turn, often stems from a shared 
social understanding. Id. Thus, the judiciary’s legitimacy is undermined if its decision makers alienate 
certain cultural perspectives. See id. One “obvious example” is illustrated by the fact that “ he Jim 
Crow exclusion of African Americans from juries led to a cynical and dispirited view of legal institu-
tions in minority communities.” Id. at 885 (citation omitted). Aside from cultural alienation, the 
Court’s intrusion into the jury’s province alarms those who recognize the need for a democratic check 
on the judicial process. See Robertson, supra note 22, at 206 (“Fear of a runaway jury is not the only 
threat to public legitimacy, however; indeed, fear of unchecked judicial power may pose just as much 
of a concern to the public.”). 
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between the sufferer’s spouse (who might point to the meal) and doctor (who 
might look for gastrointestinal explanations).271A factfinder’s unique experi-
ences and perspectives frequently determine which inferences will appear most 
likely.272 One scholar, for example, has already empirically demonstrated that 
under Twombly and Iqbal, white judges dismiss discrimination claims on the 
pleadings more frequently than African-American judges.273 Thus, drawing 
from a cross-section of the community capitalizes on the Bayesian view of prob-
ability, a conceptual interpretation that views probabilities as subjective evalua-
tions informed by past experience, and thus posits that “all probabilities [are] in 
the mind of the beholder.”274 Because “both jurors and judges may resort to heu-
ristic decision making,”275 there is an inherent danger in allowing a case to fall 
prey to a single judge’s heuristics rather than a diverse jury’s. 
Perhaps no case better serves as a cautionary warning than Scott v. Harris, a 
2007 case in which a majority of the Supreme Court held, after viewing a video 
of a police chase, that “no reasonable jury could have believed” the plaintiff’s 
assertion that the police officers involved used unnecessary deadly force.276 
What the Supreme Court majority failed to consider—presumably because the 
justices’ own experiences with police officers were different from the plain-
tiff’s—were “the competing, culturally grounded affective responses a high-
speed police chase is likely to evoke: from fear of those who defy lawful authori-
ty; to resentment of abuses of power by the police; to distrust of authority gener-
ally; to anger at apparent indifference to the well-being of innocent bystand-
ers.”277 Empirical evidence demonstrates that, in fact, many laypeople did not 
share the Supreme Court’s views of the video.278 The Court’s decision “rigorous-
ly excludes” those who held this minority view, ultimately characterizing their 
perspectives as “unreasonable.”279 Thus, judicial encroachment on the jury’s role 
                                                                                                                           
 271 Pardo & Allen, supra note 73, at 231–32. 
 272 Schnapper, supra note 3, at 281 (“The understanding and experiences [that] a trier of fact 
brings to a case is often of decisive significance in the selection of inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence.”). Accordingly, one commentator has observed that “a growing literature suggests that 
whether a person perceives discrimination depends, in part, on the person’s background.” Sandra 
Sperino, Judicial Preemption of Punitive Damages, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 227, 252 (2009). 
 273 Victor D. Quintanilla, Critical Race Empiricism: A New Means to Measure Civil Procedure, 3 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 187, 211 (2013) (“White and Black judges decided Black plaintiffs’ claims com-
parably under notice pleading, but . . . White judges [have] granted dismissal at a higher rate than 
Black judges under plausibility pleading.”). 
 274 See Friedman, supra note 86, at 518; see also Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Proba-
tive Value of DNA Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 
859, 863–64 (1996) (“According to Bayesian logic, one’s prior beliefs . . . are combined with a quanti-
tative measure of the probative value of the new evidence to form posterior beliefs.”). 
 275 Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 312–13 (2013). 
 276 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). 
 277 See Kahan et al., supra note 107, at 854. 
 278 Id. at 864–66. 
 279 Id. at 842. 
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in drawing inferences violates an important tenet of our judicial system: ensuring 
that disputes are resolved by a group of people whose diverse attributes and ex-
periences accurately reflect the community.280 
In Bayesian terms, then, jurors can have different “priors” from judges 
and, indeed, from each other.281 Juries also tend to reason differently from 
judges. Whereas law school trains lawyers and judges to apply linear reason-
ing,282 jurors assess the whole body of evidence and decide the most probable 
narrative that can be drawn from it.283 The Supreme Court has recognized the 
importance of analyzing evidence holistically rather than piecemeal; “as its 
pieces come together[,] a narrative gains momentum.”284 
Perhaps it might be worth compromising these important benefits of the 
jury system if doing so would lead to objectively more accurate and consistent 
results. After all, jury trials are criticized for their tendency to produce incon-
sistent verdicts.285 Research also suggests that jurors are often biased and una-
ware of pertinent information.286 And it stands to reason that improper consid-
erations are more likely to infect close cases than clear-cut ones. At bottom, 
then, a thorough debate might lead some to conclude that the Fifth Amendment 
due process right should sometimes override the Seventh Amendment jury-trial 
right.287 
                                                                                                                           
 280 See Thomas, supra note 107, at 776 (noting the importance of “a fair cross-section of the 
community, including people with different characteristics and experiences”). 
 281 See Koehler, supra note 274, at 863–64. 
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 286 Justin Sevier, Omission Suspicion: Juries, Hearsay, and Attorneys’ Strategic Choices, 40 FLA. 
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But the empirical evidence also “points to jurors being remarkably con-
scientious in their work.”288 Courts recognize as much in criminal cases, con-
tinuing to show strong deference to jurors’ ability to reach conclusions about a 
defendant’s state of mind based upon circumstantial evidence.289 Furthermore, 
there is no reason to believe that transferring power from juries to judges in-
creases consistency; in fact, research shows that judges and jurors are equally 
susceptible to “improper considerations.”290 And judges frequently disagree 
with each other, confirming that—like jurors—their individual characteristics 
affect their evaluations of evidence.291 Consider the disagreement between the 
five-justice majority and four dissenters in the Court’s 1986 decision in Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., regarding whether the de-
fendant’s conduct made “economic sense.”292 Consider also divided appellate 
panels or appellate decisions that reverse trial courts on sufficiency ques-
tions.293 Two judges’ determination of what is “reasonable” is a third judge’s 
“legal travesty.”294 As Justice John Paul Stevens pointed out in Scott, “If two 
                                                                                                                           
 288 Nance, supra note 129, at 228 (citing JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA (1988)) (exam-
ining a variety of studies on aspects of juror behavior and decision making); see HARRY KALVEN, JR. 
& HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 149 (1966). In one study, the overwhelming majority of sur-
veyed jurors believed that fellow jurors “took their duties seriously.” GUINTHER, supra, at 83. Fur-
thermore, empirical evidence suggests that juries generally comprehend the facts and posture of the 
case and that they usually decide the case in accordance with the weight of the evidence. KALVEN & 
ZEISEL, supra, at 149; see also Robertson, supra note 22, at 159 & n.4 (observing that “juries decide 
cases accurately in approximately eight out of nine cases” (citing Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the 
Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305, 307 (2007))). 
 289 E.g., McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 270 (1992) (“It goes without saying that 
matters of intent are for the jury to consider.”); United States v. Terry, 707 F.3d 607, 613 (6th Cir. 
2013) (noting that for purposes of assessing a defendant’s participation in a bribery agreement, “the 
question is one of inferences taken from what participants say, mean[,] and do, all matters that juries 
are fully equipped to assess”). 
 290 Griffin, supra note 275, at 329 n.272. 
 291 Thomas, supra note 107, at 769. 
 292 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Compare id. at 596–97 (reasoning that the defendants had “no ra-
tional economic motive to conspire”), with id. at 604 (White, J., dissenting) (recognizing the possibil-
ity that the defendants “valued profit-maximization over growth”). One commentator argues that the 
justices based their decisions on their “different views of the facts.” Thomas, supra note 107, at 772–
73. 
 293 Levin, supra note 15, at 148 (“Every time a court of appeals divides on what might be reason-
able is evidence that different views exist, as is every instance in which an appellate court reverses a 
lower court on this question.”). 
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groups of judges can disagree so vehemently . . . , it seems eminently likely 
that a reasonable juror could disagree.”295 
Finally, usurping the jury’s inference-drawing function has political rami-
fications. One commentator laments the loss of the civil jury trial’s role as a 
“safeguard against tyranny.”296 Equally important is the loss of the jury’s pow-
er to add a gloss to a rule of decision.297 For example, when jurors are permit-
ted to exercise their inference-drawing power, they apply principles such as 
“reasonable speed and “ordinary care” to particular disputes.298 Another exam-
ple: the “rule of reason” standard established in antitrust cases under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act,299 where “the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case 
in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an 
unreasonable restraint on competition.”300 Jury verdicts thus serve as an ex-
pression of the community’s tolerance or intolerance for certain kinds of con-
duct and, in so doing, significantly influence the national character.301 Individ-
ually, juries resolve discrete disputes; collectively, their verdicts are “a reflec-
tion of community values and norms.”302 When judges take inference-drawing 
duties away from juries, they necessarily substitute their own values and norms 
for those that the jury would bring to bear in reaching their verdicts. This result 
undermines the jury’s political function and skews the way in which we shape 
and perceive community standards. 
A cynic might suggest that something nefarious is happening, while oth-
ers point to more benign explanations.303 Certainly, there is room for turf dis-
putes whenever we allocate power between different institutions, as I have ar-
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gued in the context of appellate jurisdiction.304 These disputes center on not on 
who should win a particular conflict, but rather on who should decide it.305 
Perhaps the conflict is highlighted in the context of judges and juries because 
there has never been a clear partition between their respective roles.306 Never-
theless, the Framers clearly believed that jury trials were indispensable because 
they constrained judicial power to decide cases.307 
Chief Justice John Roberts admonishes that “a judge’s job is to ‘call balls 
and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.’”308 But judges generally fail to limit their 
power relative to that of the jury.309 It is time to address that problem, and I 
now turn to my solution for doing so. 
IV. A THREE-PRONGED SOLUTION FOR REEMPOWERING THE CIVIL JURY IN 
STATE-OF-MIND CASES WHILE ADDRESSING THE ASSOCIATED COSTS 
If we continue to value the democratic principles that underlie the jury 
system, then we cannot tolerate its gradual decline through judicial decisions 
that erode the jury’s power but fail to grapple with the important Seventh 
Amendment concerns at stake. At the same time, any proposal that seeks to 
restore the jury’s inference-drawing domain must realistically account for the 
underlying concerns, real or perceived, that have animated this erosion. Pri-
marily, these concerns focus on the costs of litigation310 and the costs of errant 
jury verdicts.311 
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This Part offers a solution that encompasses all these considerations, 
striking a balance in state-of-mind cases between due process and jury-trial 
rights without significantly compromising either. It involves three interlocking 
components: (1) precluding the pretrial disposition of cases that turn on a par-
ty’s mental state;312 (2) implementing a fee-shifting procedure to protect pre-
vailing defendants from paying for the cost of litigating cases that involve ex-
tremely weak factual inferences;313 and (3) making liberal use of the judicial 
power to grant new trials in cases where the jury has drawn questionable factu-
al inferences.314 The first component would restore the jury’s inference-
drawing power, whereas the second and third would guard against its misuse. 
A. Precluding the Pretrial Disposition of Cases Involving Mental State 
The first component of my proposal would preclude courts from resolving 
cases without a trial whenever state of mind is a dispositive issue. In these cas-
es, the critical facts are typically within the exclusive domain of the party ac-
cused of wrongdoing. Therefore, the jury should be permitted to evaluate all 
evidence, including demeanor evidence, and to draw the dispositive inferences. 
This deference to juries would in no way interfere with the judicial power to 
decide a case by applying law to undisputed facts, which is the proper exercise 
of judicial authority.315 Nor would it preclude a judge from granting a motion 
to dismiss or summary judgment on an element of the claim not implicating 
the defendant’s state of mind. For example, a court could grant summary 
judgment to the defendant on a fraud claim if the record established that the 
plaintiff suffered no damages. But it would not permit a judge to decide state-
of-mind cases without a trial simply because the judge is convinced that the 
evidence supports only one inference about the defendant’s state of mind.316 
To implement this aspect of my proposal, it would suffice to incorporate a 
state-of-mind exception into the existing motion-to-dismiss and summary-
judgment rules,317 as well as the rule governing judgment as a matter of law 
during and after trial.318 But the exception would apply only to the extent the 
resolution of the case turns on state of mind; if the motion establishes the mo-
vant’s right to judgment on a different element of the claim, such as causation 
or damages, the court should still grant the motion. 
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Properly defining what qualifies as a state-of-mind case is fairly straight-
forward. The category encompasses any claim in which the plaintiff must 
demonstrate the defendant’s knowledge, motive, or intent in order to prevail—
an analysis that courts already undertake without difficulty.319 Simply listing 
the elements of the claim should identify whether the claim fits the bill. For 
example, cases involving intentional torts, civil rights, discrimination, corpo-
rate wrongdoing, and unlawful conspiracies all require proving a defendant’s 
state of mind or surreptitious behavior.320 Even simple negligence cases can 
involve a defendant’s state of mind, as in premises-liability cases in which the 
defendant’s awareness of a hazard is dispositive.321 
We can illustrate this proposal by applying it to the three problematic are-
as of inference drawing. First, the state-of-mind exception would preclude 
judges from relying on a finding of implausibility to take state-of-mind cases 
away from juries. Thus, in Iqbal, the allegations of knowledge and intentional 
misconduct against high-ranking government officials322 would have survived 
a pleading challenge, no matter how implausible or conclusory a judge might 
have believed them to be. Likewise, it would have been up to a jury, not a 
judge, to determine whether allegations of intentional misconduct in Matsushi-
ta were plausible from an economic standpoint.323 Importantly, however, judg-
es would not be required to refrain from dismissing complaints with implausi-
ble allegations that do not implicate state of mind. Justice David Souter’s ex-
amples in Iqbal of “allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as 
we know it,” such as “claims about little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent 
trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel,”324 would not survive without cor-
roborative evidence. Likewise, the plaintiff’s allegations in Arnstein v. Por-
ter— that Cole Porter’s stooges had ransacked his apartment325—would not 
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have survived summary judgment based merely on the plaintiff’s speculation. 
But judges should not dismiss state-of-mind allegations out of hand simply by 
characterizing them as implausible or fantastic. Instead, the jury should evalu-
ate the plausibility of those allegations after scrutinizing the key actors’ live 
testimony at trial.326 
Second, this proposal would permit juries to consider which of two osten-
sibly equal inferences is more likely to be true, in effect restoring the Lavender 
rule for state-of-mind cases.327 Consequently, the allegations of parallel con-
duct in Twombly would survive to trial, notwithstanding the Court’s conclusion 
that parallel conduct is merely consistent with, and not determinative of, an 
antitrust conspiracy.328 On the other hand, Lavender involved equally plausible 
inferences of causation, not a state-of-mind issue—so Lavender itself would 
actually have come out differently under my proposal.329  
Third, my proposal would permit parties carrying the burden of proof to 
meet that burden with resort to the antithesis inference in state-of-mind cases, 
thus embracing Judge Frank’s views on that subject330 and abrogating the rule 
established in Liberty Lobby.331 This aspect of my proposal is perhaps the most 
controversial; unlike the other categories of inference drawing, the Supreme 
Court has never embraced this one fully, nor have commentators recommended 
it. One scholar, for example, has declined to endorse a rule that would preclude 
summary judgment when the nonmovant has no affirmative evidence and of-
fers only impeachment of the movant’s witnesses.332 Nevertheless, this scholar 
recognizes that it can be “troublesome”333 to ignore impeachment of interest-
ed-party witnesses, and my proposal responds to that trouble in state-of-mind 
cases. This component of my proposal also has the practical consequence of 
complicating appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency, as Judge Hand ex-
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plained in Dyer v. MacDougall.334 But I believe the third component of my 
solution (more liberal granting of new trials) helps assuage concerns about the 
obstacles to a sufficiency review.335 Furthermore, so long as the antithesis in-
ference is available as an evidentiary tool only in state-of-mind cases—and 
only on the state-of-mind element of those cases—it will not interfere with 
pretrial disposition in other types of cases. For example, the inference would 
not affect most ordinary-negligence cases, where the plaintiff typically has 
equal access to proof, where the defendant’s demeanor is often less probative 
of liability, and where the factual inferences are likely to be perceived similarly 
by a diverse spectrum of jurors.336 
My proposal’s most obvious difficulties would be the impact it would 
have on the court system due to the increase in cases that would require trial, 
the added expense of discovery and trial for litigants, and the added risk of 
liability for a defendant who might currently succeed in obtaining dismissal on 
the pleadings or summary judgment. But the impact would be limited to cases 
turning on state of mind; motion practice would still be available in all other 
types of cases. Thus, for example, my proposal does not limit summary judg-
ment to only those cases that involve documentary evidence, an extreme view 
that some commentators have ascribed to Judge Frank.337 And not every case 
would proceed to discovery or trial; many of the state-of-mind cases that 
would survive motions to dismiss and for summary judgment under my pro-
posal would settle, imposing no trial costs on the court system or the parties.338 
At the same time, many state-of-mind cases would likely proceed to tri-
al—more than do so now—inevitably increasing the cost of disposition. But 
the increased costs are not troubling; they are acceptable if what we get in ex-
change is the priceless benefit of preserving the jury’s constitutional func-
tion.339 Moreover, we should not shy away from imposing higher costs to 
wrongdoers in cases that present adequate circumstantial evidence for a jury to 
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find liability. We should reserve our concerns only for those cases that present 
a risk of a false positive—cases that impose litigation costs or liability on de-
fendants who should not bear them. For that reason, my proposal has two addi-
tional components designed to ensure that innocent defendants do not unfairly 
bear the burden of restoring the jury’s inference-drawing function. 
B. Fee-Shifting Protections in Extremely Weak Cases 
The second component of my proposal is a fee-shifting paradigm, de-
signed to mitigate the risk that plaintiffs will unfairly exploit greater access to 
jury trials as a way to drive up litigation costs and extract unwarranted settle-
ments. To prevent that abuse, I would empower trial judges, through an 
amendment to the rules of civil procedure, to shift litigation expenses in state-
of-mind cases if the jury concludes that the inferences supporting the plain-
tiff’s case were extremely weak. 
Fee shifting is not a new concept in law or in scholarly literature.340 The 
“American Rule” and the “English Rule” are the well-known approaches to fee 
allocation; under the former, each party pays its own attorney fees, regardless 
of the outcome,341 and under the latter, the court can award attorney fees to 
whichever party prevails.342 The two rules reflect competing considerations 
about access to the courts and allocating the costs of litigation. The U.S. sys-
tem requires parties to pay their own litigation expenses regardless of the 
case’s outcome,343 with certain notable statutory exceptions.344 To be sure, the 
English Rule enjoys support from numerous commentators who commend its 
adoption in the United States,345 and others have more generally advocated for 
a rule that restrains plaintiffs from bringing weak claims to a jury but does not 
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excessively chill litigation of small claims.346 Commentators also note that fee 
shifting can promote or discourage settlement, depending on risk tolerance and 
a party’s accurate evaluation of the chances of prevailing.347 
My proposal does not require a wholesale rejection of the American Rule 
or a wholesale adoption of the English Rule. Instead, it would work in tandem 
with the first component of my proposal to ensure that plaintiffs do not unfair-
ly exploit their greater access to jury trials in state-of-mind cases. If the trial 
court believes that the plaintiff’s inferences are questionable, it would pose an 
interrogatory to the jury to test the strength of those inferences. The following 
is an example of such a strength-testing interrogatory: 
Do not answer this question unless you have already reached a ver-
dict and that verdict is unanimously for the defendant. 
Indicate how you would characterize the plaintiff’s case: 
____ Strong but not strong enough to meet her burden of proof 
____ Weak but plausible or somewhat believable 
____ Extremely weak and not at all plausible or believable 
If the jury finds the plaintiff’s case “strong” or “weak,” then there would be no 
fee shifting. But if the jury finds the plaintiff’s case “extremely weak,” the 
judge would then have the discretion to require the plaintiff to reimburse the 
defendant’s attorney fees. 
There are several moments in litigation when the judge could determine 
whether to submit a strength-testing interrogatory. That decision could accom-
pany a ruling on any dispositive motion, or it could occur during the charge 
conference with other arguments over jury instructions. A judge would have 
wide discretion, on the basis of her own evaluation of the evidence, to con-
clude that the inferences are weak enough to warrant the interrogatory. The 
neutral wording of the interrogatory and its admonition to answer it only if 
there has already been a unanimous defense verdict would ensure that no party 
would ever suffer unfair prejudice from its inclusion.348 There would thus be 
                                                                                                                           
 346 Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fischbach, Rethinking Optimality in Tort Litigation: The Prom-
ise of Reverse Cost-Shifting, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 317, 321 (2005). 
 347 See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, From “Loser Pays” to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules: Rec-
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 348 Federal civil juries must reach unanimous verdicts. FED. R. CIV. P. 48(b). In jurisdictions that 
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the plaintiff—would be sufficient to establish that the plaintiff’s case was not extremely weak, thus 
obviating the need for an answer to the strength-testing interrogatory. 
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no difficulty in deferring entirely to the judge’s subjective evaluation of the 
evidence in deciding whether to submit the issue to the jury. 
If the jury reaches a defense verdict and makes a finding that the plaintiff’s 
case was “extremely weak,” the judge would make a discretionary determination 
whether to award fees and, if so, how much to award. Statutes granting judges 
such discretion are common, especially regarding attorney fees.349 In exercising 
that discretion, the judge could take into consideration several factors. 
First, the court could consider whether plaintiffs made the decision to 
proceed to trial even in the face of unequivocal warnings about the weaknesses 
in their case and the prospect of fee shifting. Once the judge makes the deter-
mination to submit the interrogatory, plaintiffs could still proceed to trial, but 
would have a strong incentive not to do so350 unless they are firmly convinced 
that either: (1) the paper evidence fails to capture the overall picture of the evi-
dence that they expect to adduce at trial through live testimony; or (2) the 
judge’s heuristics underlie the decision but are not fairly representative of the 
anticipated jurors’ heuristics. Plaintiffs would have to be willing to absorb the 
financial risk of evaluating their case incorrectly. Plaintiffs unwilling to absorb 
that risk would choose not to proceed. 
Second, the court could consider the related question whether the parties 
were reasonable in their pretrial settlement positions. Evaluating settlement 
conduct would give both sides an incentive to settle, as several states have rec-
ognized in crafting fee-shifting statutes.351 Plaintiffs would want to pursue set-
tlement both to avoid the risk of losing on their claims and to avoid the poten-
tial liability for attorney fees. Defendants would likewise want to avoid the risk 
of losing a verdict but might find the prospect of winning attorney fees an in-
centive to proceed to trial without a corresponding requirement that they at-
tempt to settle in good faith. 
Third, the court could consider the plaintiff’s ability to pay the defend-
ant’s attorney fees, taking care to ensure at all times that the system remains 
compensatory and not punitive or financially crippling. This is not unprece-
                                                                                                                           
 349 Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 254–56 (2010) (discussing judicial 
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dented; appellate courts already consider “ability to pay” as a factor in setting 
the amount of a fee award.352 Doing so obviously reduces the utility of fee 
shifting in cases brought by plaintiffs without the resources to cover the de-
fendant’s expenses. But it also addresses a criticism of the English Rule, which 
favors the wealthy.353 On balance, providing all plaintiffs with full access to 
our civil justice system and permitting jurors to evaluate circumstantial evi-
dence are more important than indemnifying defendants from the costs of liti-
gation, especially because defendants may always seek attorney fees “when a 
party brings an action in bad faith.”354 
One final consideration on the fee-shifting provision is that it would have 
no direct impact on extremely weak cases that a plaintiff dismisses voluntarily 
before trial—after the defendant has already incurred substantial legal expens-
es in discovery and motion practice. Some might argue that my proposal would 
do nothing to discourage plaintiffs from pursuing a case as long as possible 
before trial in the hope of extracting a settlement—and then dismissing a case, 
if necessary, before a jury ever has a chance to answer the strength-testing in-
terrogatory.355 I question the validity of that concern because plaintiffs (and 
their lawyers) have their own incentive not to incur discovery costs in weak 
cases. Moreover, if experience demonstrates that plaintiffs are using dismissals 
to avoid the fee-shifting prong of my proposal, it would be easy enough to ad-
just the proposal to prevent that abuse—including by entering a fee-shifting 
order as a condition of dismissal, which the rules already permit.356 
                                                                                                                           
 352 See, e.g., Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2006); Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 
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 355 See Developments in the Law—Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 942 (1961) (“[I]t is . . . pos-
sible for a party to employ the discovery procedures for wholly illegitimate ends—the mere threat of 
extensive discovery, with its attendant specter of harassment and expense, may induce a party to ac-
cept an otherwise injudicious settlement.”). 
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C. New Trials Where Juries Draw Questionable Inferences 
The third component of my proposal serves as another protection against 
the possibility that jurors may accept questionable inferences and render ver-
dicts for plaintiffs in cases that presently would fail to survive a paper chal-
lenge. To guard against the higher risk of incorrect verdicts, judges could in-
voke their power to grant new trials based on the manifest weight of the evi-
dence. 
The procedural rules already authorize trial judges not only to grant 
judgment as a matter of law for evidentiary insufficiency, but also to grant re-
trial.357 But in practice, trial courts resort infrequently to this remedy.358 The 
rare invocation of the new trial is partially owing to uncertainty about the 
standard for a new trial, as compared to the standard for granting judgment as a 
matter of law.359 
Nevertheless, the new-trial remedy has been described as a “weapon to 
combat unjust jury verdicts,” which a judge may invoke “when the judge be-
lieves, but does not know for certain, that the jury based its verdict on some-
thing other than a rational review of the evidence.”360 And it has its own dis-
crete standard; a new trial on manifest-weight grounds is available when the 
evidence is theoretically sufficient for a jury to have found for the plaintiff, 
“but the verdict is nevertheless so contrary to the great weight of the evidence 
that the trial judge concludes that the verdict was based on something other 
than reason.”361 
This standard, and the timing of a new-trial motion carry with them im-
portant differences from pretrial dispositive-motion practice. A judge who or-
                                                                                                                           
 357 FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)–(b). 
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ders a retrial has a first-hand familiarity with the case and witnesses.362 Thus, 
unlike pretrial dispositive motions that rely on the cold paper evidence, mo-
tions for a new trial call upon the judge to consider the evidence after a live-
witness trial.363 The judge, like the jury, can draw inferences from the overall 
collage of evidence, including witness demeanor.364 
Importantly, though, judges do not use their inferences to reach the ulti-
mate verdict or to supplant the jury’s inference-drawing function. If a judge 
disagrees with a jury’s inference-based verdict in a state-of-mind case, the 
remedy is to order a new trial, not to enter judgment as a matter of law. And in 
that new trial, a second jury is called upon to reevaluate the evidence. This su-
pervision of the judicial process enables judges to require that plaintiffs 
demonstrate that a second jury would draw the same inferences as the first—in 
short, that the result of the first trial was not an aberration.365 If the second jury 
also finds for the plaintiff, then the matter is concluded.366 In this way, both the 
judge and the jury contribute in evaluating the evidence with the jury reaching 
the ultimate conclusion.367 
Of course, rejecting the first jury’s verdict encroaches to some extent on 
its independence.368 But the requirement that the ultimate verdict be rendered 
by a jury, and not by the judge, ensures that the judge’s power is a “safety 
valve” for the jury, rather than a usurpation of its essential function.369 The 
new trial, then, is a device “to minimize jury inferential error” without usurp-
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 369 Id. at 177. 
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ing the ultimate inference-drawing function.370 The remedy thus fits with the 
historical conception of the jury trial right371 and may even safeguard the pow-
er of the jury372 by serving as a more moderate check on inaccurate verdicts 
than decisions that judges would otherwise (and currently do) make on their 
own.373 
Those who fear runaway juries, and who thus might otherwise object to 
the first component of my proposal, can take solace in the fact that a single 
jury would no longer have the power to impose liability in a case presenting 
ostensibly weak inferences on paper, unless the judge ultimately agrees that the 
trial evidence changed the complexion of the case and justified the jury’s ver-
dict. My proposal thus strikes a balance between the important sociopolitical 
concerns that underlie the Seventh Amendment and the dangers, real or per-
ceived, of jury imperfection. 
But more frequent resort to new trials does create an important problem: 
the cost of multiple trials. Fee shifting, according to the second prong of my 
proposal, should not be an option if a plaintiff has already convinced a jury to 
find in her favor. By definition, the inferences were not extremely weak if the 
first jury has already found liability. But allowing the case to proceed to trial a 
second time is a better option for plaintiffs than dismissal on paper motions, 
which is the current norm. Additionally, for the defendant found liable in the 
first trial, retrial is presumably a better option than accepting unwarranted lia-
bility. To the extent the parties in a particular case disagree with that economic 
assessment, they have an additional incentive to settle. 
Retrials would also be costly in terms of the trial court’s resources, a con-
sequence that is unlikely to fare well in the Supreme Court.374 Judge Frank 
offered a glib response to the latter criticism—that the solution was “the ap-
pointment of a sufficient number of judges, not by doing injustice through de-
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priving litigants of a fair method of trial.”375 More practically, there is every 
reason to question whether disposition without a trial (even multiple trials) is 
any more efficient, as Justice Black observed in his 1968 criticism of a case 
that took eleven years to reach its summary-judgment conclusion.376 Professor 
Miller, likewise, notes that the expense and frequency of litigating summary-
judgment motions and the frequency of appeals from decisions granting them 
have undermined arguments espousing summary judgment as beneficial to ju-
dicial efficiency.377 In any event, the quantifiable costs of jury trials, standing 
alone, establish nothing, because the benefits of the jury system are beyond 
numerical quantification. Thus, in the case of this fundamental right, a tradi-
tional cost-benefit comparison is simply impossible.378 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most insidious aspect of the assault on the jury’s inference-
drawing domain is the absence of any meaningful opportunity to resist it. 
Judges interpret the Constitution, and judges are responsible for promulgating 
litigation rules. Therein lies a troubling irony; jurors can exercise their demo-
cratic function—including the check against abuse of judicial power—only if 
judges let them. The fox is guarding the henhouse, and the chickens are not 
faring so well. 
But the death of inference in state-of-mind cases is not irrevocable; we 
can and should revive it. We must preserve the inference-drawing function that 
the Seventh Amendment clearly bestows on individual citizens who partici-
pate, through jury service, in the political process. My proposal would pre-
clude pretrial disposition of cases that turn on a party’s mental state, implement 
a fee-shifting procedure to protect prevailing defendants when plaintiffs’ 
claims are extremely weak, and utilize new trials in cases where the jury has 
drawn questionable inferences. The combined effects of these procedural 
changes would restore the balance of power, while simultaneously accounting 
for the cost-of-litigation and cost-of-liability concerns that appear to animate 
the usurpation of the jury’s constitutional function. I hope that judges will ex-
ercise judicial humility and not stand in the way. 
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